On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 1:40 PM, Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 12:44 PM, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:32 AM, Linus Torvalds >> <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> >>>> Like this? >>>> >>>> http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1003.3/01225.html >>> >>> I don't know the execve_nosecurity patches, so the diff makes little >>> sense to me, but yeah, I wouldn't expect it to be more than a couple >>> of lines. Exactly *how* you set the bit etc is not something I care >>> deeply about, prctl seems about as good as anything. >>> >>>> Note that there's a huge can of worms if execve is allowed but >>>> suid/sgid is not: selinux may elevate privileges on exec of pretty >>>> much anything. (I think that this is a really awful idea, but it's in >>>> the kernel, so we're stuck with it.) >>> >>> You can do any amount of crazy things with selinux, but the other side >>> of the coin is that it would also be trivial to teach selinux about >>> this same "restricted environment" bit, and just say that a process >>> with that bit set doesn't get to match whatever selinux privilege >>> escalation rules.. >>> >>> I really don't think this is just about "execve cannot do setuid". I >>> think it's about the process being marked as restricted. >>> >>> So in your patch, I think that "PR_RESTRICT_EXEC" bit is wrong. It >>> should simply be "PR_RESTRICT_ME", and be done with it, and not try to >>> artificially limit it to be some "execve feature", and more think of >>> it as a "this is a process that has *no* extra privileges at all, and >>> can never get them". >> >> Fair enough. I'll submit the simpler patch tonight. > > This sounds cool. Do you think you'll go for a new task_struct member > or will it a securebit? (Seems like securebits might be too tied to > posix file caps, but I figured I'd ask). Or cred member, etc. > I'm planning on going ahead and mocking up your potential patch so I > can respin this series using it and make sure I understand the > interactions. > > thanks! > will -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
