This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. This mode enables dynamic
enforcement of system call filtering policy in the kernel as specified
by a userland task. The policy is expressed in terms of a BPF program,
as is used for userland-exposed socket filtering. Instead of network
data, the BPF program is evaluated over struct user_regs_struct at the
time of the system call (as retrieved using regviews).
A filter program may be installed by a userland task by calling
prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER, &fprog);
where fprog is of type struct sock_fprog.
If the first filter program allows subsequent prctl(2) calls, then
additional filter programs may be attached. All attached programs
must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed.
To avoid CONFIG_COMPAT related landmines, once a filter program is
installed using specific is_compat_task() and current->personality, it
is not allowed to make system calls or attach additional filters which
use a different combination of is_compat_task() and
current->personality.
Filter programs may _only_ cross the execve(2) barrier if last filter
program was attached by a task with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities in its
user namespace. Once a task-local filter program is attached from a
process without privileges, execve will fail. This ensures that only
privileged parent task can affect its privileged children (e.g., setuid
binary).
There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are
as follows:
- BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time.
- Userland already knows its ABI: expected register layout and system
call numbers.
- Full register information is provided which may be relevant for
certain syscalls (fork, rt_sigreturn) or for other userland
filtering tactics (checking the PC).
- No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible.
This patch includes its own BPF evaluator, but relies on the
net/core/filter.c BPF checking code. It is possible to share
evaluators, but the performance sensitive nature of the network
filtering path makes it an iterative optimization which (I think :) can
be tackled separately via separate patchsets. (And at some point sharing
BPF JIT code!)
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/exec.c | 5 +
include/linux/prctl.h | 3 +
include/linux/seccomp.h | 70 +++++-
kernel/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/fork.c | 4 +
kernel/seccomp.c | 8 +
kernel/seccomp_filter.c | 639 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/sys.c | 4 +
security/Kconfig | 12 +
9 files changed, 743 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/seccomp_filter.c
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 3625464..e9cc89c 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
@@ -1477,6 +1478,10 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
if (retval)
goto out_ret;
+ retval = seccomp_check_exec();
+ if (retval)
+ goto out_ret;
+
retval = -ENOMEM;
bprm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bprm)
diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h
index a3baeb2..15e2460 100644
--- a/include/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/prctl.h
@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22
+/* Set process seccomp filters */
+#define PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER 36
+
/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */
#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index cc7a4e9..99d163e 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -5,9 +5,28 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
#include <asm/seccomp.h>
-typedef struct { int mode; } seccomp_t;
+struct seccomp_filter;
+/**
+ * struct seccomp_struct - the state of a seccomp'ed process
+ *
+ * @mode:
+ * if this is 0, seccomp is not in use.
+ * is 1, the process is under standard seccomp rules.
+ * is 2, the process is only allowed to make system calls where
+ * associated filters evaluate successfully.
+ * @filter: Metadata for filter if using CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER.
+ * @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
+ * is no guard.
+ */
+typedef struct seccomp_struct {
+ int mode;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter;
+#endif
+} seccomp_t;
extern void __secure_computing(int);
static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)
@@ -28,8 +47,7 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
#include <linux/errno.h>
-typedef struct { } seccomp_t;
-
+typedef struct seccomp_struct { } seccomp_t;
#define secure_computing(x) do { } while (0)
static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
@@ -49,4 +67,50 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+
+#define seccomp_filter_init_task(_tsk) do { \
+ (_tsk)->seccomp.filter = NULL; \
+} while (0);
+
+/* No locking is needed here because the task_struct will
+ * have no parallel consumers.
+ */
+#define seccomp_filter_free_task(_tsk) do { \
+ put_seccomp_filter((_tsk)->seccomp.filter); \
+} while (0);
+
+extern int seccomp_check_exec(void);
+
+extern long prctl_attach_seccomp_filter(char __user *);
+
+extern struct seccomp_filter *get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *);
+extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *);
+
+extern int seccomp_test_filters(int);
+extern void seccomp_filter_log_failure(int);
+extern void seccomp_filter_fork(struct task_struct *child,
+ struct task_struct *parent);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+struct seccomp_filter { };
+#define seccomp_filter_init_task(_tsk) do { } while (0);
+#define seccomp_filter_fork(_tsk, _orig) do { } while (0);
+#define seccomp_filter_free_task(_tsk) do { } while (0);
+
+static inline int seccomp_check_exec(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static inline long prctl_attach_seccomp_filter(char __user *a2)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
#endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index e898c5b..0584090 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK) += hung_task.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR) += watchdog.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HARDIRQS) += irq/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP) += seccomp.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) += seccomp_filter.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST) += rcutorture.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TREE_RCU) += rcutree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU) += rcutree.o
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index da4a6a1..cc1d628 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
@@ -166,6 +167,7 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
free_thread_info(tsk->stack);
rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk);
ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk);
+ seccomp_filter_free_task(tsk);
free_task_struct(tsk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_task);
@@ -1209,6 +1211,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
/* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */
sched_fork(p);
+ seccomp_filter_init_task(p);
retval = perf_event_init_task(p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
@@ -1375,6 +1378,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
threadgroup_fork_read_unlock(current);
perf_event_fork(p);
+ seccomp_filter_fork(p, current);
return p;
bad_fork_free_pid:
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 57d4b13..78719be 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -47,6 +47,14 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
return;
} while (*++syscall);
break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+ case 2:
+ if (seccomp_test_filters(this_syscall) == 0)
+ return;
+
+ seccomp_filter_log_failure(this_syscall);
+ break;
+#endif
default:
BUG();
}
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp_filter.c b/kernel/seccomp_filter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4770847
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/seccomp_filter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,639 @@
+/* bpf program-based system call filtering
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/reciprocal_div.h>
+#include <linux/regset.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/user.h>
+
+
+/**
+ * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
+ *
+ * @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime.
+ * get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance
+ * outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this
+ * is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
+ * @creator: pointer to the pid that created this filter
+ * @parent: pointer to the ancestor which this filter will be composed with.
+ * @flags: provide information about filter from creation time.
+ * @personality: personality of the process at filter creation time.
+ * @insns: the BPF program instructions to evaluate
+ * @count: the number of instructions in the program.
+ *
+ * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
+ * to a task_struct (other than @usage).
+ */
+struct seccomp_filter {
+ struct kref usage;
+ struct pid *creator;
+ struct seccomp_filter *parent;
+ struct {
+ uint32_t admin:1, /* can allow execve */
+ compat:1, /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+ __reserved:30;
+ } flags;
+ int personality;
+ unsigned short count; /* Instruction count */
+ struct sock_filter insns[0];
+};
+
+static unsigned int seccomp_run_filter(const u8 *buf,
+ const size_t buflen,
+ const struct sock_filter *);
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_filter_alloc - allocates a new filter object
+ * @padding: size of the insns[0] array in bytes
+ *
+ * The @padding should be a multiple of
+ * sizeof(struct sock_filter).
+ *
+ * Returns ERR_PTR on error or an allocated object.
+ */
+static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_filter_alloc(unsigned long padding)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *f;
+ unsigned long bpf_blocks = padding / sizeof(struct sock_filter);
+
+ /* Drop oversized requests. */
+ if (bpf_blocks == 0 || bpf_blocks > BPF_MAXINSNS)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ /* Padding should always be in sock_filter increments. */
+ BUG_ON(padding % sizeof(struct sock_filter));
+
+ f = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter) + padding, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!f)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ kref_init(&f->usage);
+ f->creator = get_task_pid(current, PIDTYPE_PID);
+ f->count = bpf_blocks;
+ return f;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_filter_free - frees the allocated filter.
+ * @filter: NULL or live object to be completely destructed.
+ */
+static void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ if (!filter)
+ return;
+ put_seccomp_filter(filter->parent);
+ put_pid(filter->creator);
+ kfree(filter);
+}
+
+static void __put_seccomp_filter(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *orig =
+ container_of(kref, struct seccomp_filter, usage);
+ seccomp_filter_free(orig);
+}
+
+void seccomp_filter_log_failure(int syscall)
+{
+ pr_info("%s[%d]: system call %d blocked at 0x%lx\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), syscall,
+ KSTK_EIP(current));
+}
+
+/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of @orig and may free. */
+void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *orig)
+{
+ if (!orig)
+ return;
+ kref_put(&orig->usage, __put_seccomp_filter);
+}
+
+/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of @orig. */
+struct seccomp_filter *get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *orig)
+{
+ if (!orig)
+ return NULL;
+ kref_get(&orig->usage);
+ return orig;
+}
+
+static int seccomp_check_personality(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ if (filter->personality != current->personality)
+ return -EACCES;
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ if (filter->flags.compat != (!!(is_compat_task())))
+ return -EACCES;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct user_regset *
+find_prstatus(const struct user_regset_view *view)
+{
+ const struct user_regset *regset;
+ int n;
+
+ /* Skip 0. */
+ for (n = 1; n < view->n; ++n) {
+ regset = view->regsets + n;
+ if (regset->core_note_type == NT_PRSTATUS)
+ return regset;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_get_regs - returns a pointer to struct user_regs_struct
+ * @scratch: preallocated storage of size @available
+ * @available: pointer to the size of scratch.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if the registers cannot be acquired or copied.
+ * Returns a populated pointer to @scratch by default.
+ * Otherwise, returns a pointer to a a u8 array containing the struct
+ * user_regs_struct appropriate for the task personality. The pointer
+ * may be to the beginning of @scratch or to an externally managed data
+ * structure. On success, @available should be updated with the
+ * valid region size of the returned pointer.
+ *
+ * If the architecture overrides the linkage, then the pointer may pointer to
+ * another location.
+ */
+__weak u8 *seccomp_get_regs(u8 *scratch, size_t *available)
+{
+ /* regset is usually returned based on task personality, not current
+ * system call convention. This behavior makes it unsafe to execute
+ * BPF programs over regviews if is_compat_task or the personality
+ * have changed since the program was installed.
+ */
+ const struct user_regset_view *view = task_user_regset_view(current);
+ const struct user_regset *regset = &view->regsets[0];
+ size_t scratch_size = *available;
+ if (regset->core_note_type != NT_PRSTATUS) {
+ /* The architecture should override this method for speed. */
+ regset = find_prstatus(view);
+ if (!regset)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *available = regset->n * regset->size;
+ /* Make sure the scratch space isn't exceeded. */
+ if (*available > scratch_size)
+ *available = scratch_size;
+ if (regset->get(current, regset, 0, *available, scratch, NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ return scratch;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_test_filters - tests 'current' against the given syscall
+ * @syscall: number of the system call to test
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on ok and non-zero on error/failure.
+ */
+int seccomp_test_filters(int syscall)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter;
+ u8 regs_tmp[sizeof(struct user_regs_struct)], *regs;
+ size_t regs_size = sizeof(struct user_regs_struct);
+ int ret = -EACCES;
+
+ filter = current->seccomp.filter; /* uses task ref */
+ if (!filter)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* All filters in the list are required to share the same system call
+ * convention so only the first filter is ever checked.
+ */
+ if (seccomp_check_personality(filter))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Grab the user_regs_struct. Normally, regs == ®s_tmp, but
+ * that is not mandatory. E.g., it may return a point to
+ * task_pt_regs(current). NULL checking is mandatory.
+ */
+ regs = seccomp_get_regs(regs_tmp, ®s_size);
+ if (!regs)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Only allow a system call if it is allowed in all ancestors. */
+ ret = 0;
+ for ( ; filter != NULL; filter = filter->parent) {
+ /* Allowed if return value is the size of the data supplied. */
+ if (seccomp_run_filter(regs, regs_size, filter->insns) !=
+ regs_size)
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_attach_filter: Attaches a seccomp filter to current.
+ * @fprog: BPF program to install
+ *
+ * Context: User context only. This function may sleep on allocation and
+ * operates on current. current must be attempting a system call
+ * when this is called (usually prctl).
+ *
+ * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
+ * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
+ * for each system call the thread makes.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an errno on failure.
+ */
+long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter = NULL;
+ /* Note, len is a short so overflow should be impossible. */
+ unsigned long fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter);
+ long ret = -EPERM;
+
+ /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
+ filter = seccomp_filter_alloc(fp_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(filter)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(filter);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Lock the process personality and calling convention. */
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ if (is_compat_task())
+ filter->flags.compat = 1;
+#endif
+ filter->personality = current->personality;
+
+ /* Auditing is not needed since the capability wasn't requested */
+ if (security_real_capable_noaudit(current, current_user_ns(),
+ CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
+ filter->flags.admin = 1;
+
+ /* Copy the instructions from fprog. */
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(filter->insns, fprog->filter, fp_size))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check the fprog */
+ ret = sk_chk_filter(filter->insns, filter->count);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* If there is an existing filter, make it the parent
+ * and reuse the existing task-based ref.
+ */
+ filter->parent = current->seccomp.filter;
+
+ /* Force all filters to use one system call convention. */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (filter->parent) {
+ if (filter->parent->flags.compat != filter->flags.compat)
+ goto out;
+ if (filter->parent->personality != filter->personality)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Double claim the new filter so we can release it below simplifying
+ * the error paths earlier.
+ */
+ ret = 0;
+ get_seccomp_filter(filter);
+ current->seccomp.filter = filter;
+ /* Engage seccomp if it wasn't. This doesn't use PR_SET_SECCOMP. */
+ if (!current->seccomp.mode) {
+ current->seccomp.mode = 2;
+ set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
+ }
+
+out:
+ put_seccomp_filter(filter); /* for get or task, on err */
+ return ret;
+}
+
+long prctl_attach_seccomp_filter(char __user *user_filter)
+{
+ struct sock_fprog fprog;
+ long ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (!user_filter)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = seccomp_attach_filter(&fprog);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_check_exec: determines if exec is allowed for current
+ * Returns 0 if allowed.
+ */
+int seccomp_check_exec(void)
+{
+ if (current->seccomp.mode != 2)
+ return 0;
+ /* We can rely on the task refcount for the filter. */
+ if (!current->seccomp.filter)
+ return -EPERM;
+ /* The last attached filter set for the process is checked. It must
+ * have been installed with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities.
+ */
+ if (current->seccomp.filter->flags.admin)
+ return 0;
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/* seccomp_filter_fork: manages inheritance on fork
+ * @child: forkee
+ * @parent: forker
+ * Ensures that @child inherit a seccomp_filter iff seccomp is enabled
+ * and the set of filters is marked as 'enabled'.
+ */
+void seccomp_filter_fork(struct task_struct *child,
+ struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+ if (!parent->seccomp.mode)
+ return;
+ child->seccomp.mode = parent->seccomp.mode;
+ child->seccomp.filter = get_seccomp_filter(parent->seccomp.filter);
+}
+
+/* Returns a pointer to the BPF evaluator after checking the offset and size
+ * boundaries. The signature almost matches the signature from
+ * net/core/filter.c with the hopes of sharing code in the future.
+ */
+static const void *load_pointer(const u8 *buf, size_t buflen,
+ int offset, size_t size,
+ void *unused)
+{
+ if (offset >= buflen)
+ goto fail;
+ if (offset < 0)
+ goto fail;
+ if (size > buflen - offset)
+ goto fail;
+ return buf + offset;
+fail:
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_run_filter - evaluate BPF (over user_regs_struct)
+ * @buf: buffer to execute the filter over
+ * @buflen: length of the buffer
+ * @fentry: filter to apply
+ *
+ * Decode and apply filter instructions to the buffer.
+ * Return length to keep, 0 for none. @buf is a regset we are
+ * filtering, @filter is the array of filter instructions.
+ * Because all jumps are guaranteed to be before last instruction,
+ * and last instruction guaranteed to be a RET, we dont need to check
+ * flen.
+ *
+ * See core/net/filter.c as this is nearly an exact copy.
+ * At some point, it would be nice to merge them to take advantage of
+ * optimizations (like JIT).
+ *
+ * A successful filter must return the full length of the data. Anything less
+ * will currently result in a seccomp failure. In the future, it may be
+ * possible to use that for hard filtering registers on the fly so it is
+ * ideal for consumers to return 0 on intended failure.
+ */
+static unsigned int seccomp_run_filter(const u8 *buf,
+ const size_t buflen,
+ const struct sock_filter *fentry)
+{
+ const void *ptr;
+ u32 A = 0; /* Accumulator */
+ u32 X = 0; /* Index Register */
+ u32 mem[BPF_MEMWORDS]; /* Scratch Memory Store */
+ u32 tmp;
+ int k;
+
+ /*
+ * Process array of filter instructions.
+ */
+ for (;; fentry++) {
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
+#define K (fentry->k)
+#else
+ const u32 K = fentry->k;
+#endif
+
+ switch (fentry->code) {
+ case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X:
+ A += X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K:
+ A += K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X:
+ A -= X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K:
+ A -= K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X:
+ A *= X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K:
+ A *= K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X:
+ if (X == 0)
+ return 0;
+ A /= X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K:
+ A = reciprocal_divide(A, K);
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X:
+ A &= X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K:
+ A &= K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X:
+ A |= X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K:
+ A |= K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X:
+ A <<= X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K:
+ A <<= K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X:
+ A >>= X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K:
+ A >>= K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ALU_NEG:
+ A = -A;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_JMP_JA:
+ fentry += K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K:
+ fentry += (A > K) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K:
+ fentry += (A >= K) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K:
+ fentry += (A == K) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K:
+ fentry += (A & K) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X:
+ fentry += (A > X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_X:
+ fentry += (A >= X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_X:
+ fentry += (A == X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_X:
+ fentry += (A & X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS:
+ k = K;
+load_w:
+ ptr = load_pointer(buf, buflen, k, 4, &tmp);
+ if (ptr != NULL) {
+ /* Note, unlike on network data, values are not
+ * byte swapped.
+ */
+ A = *(const u32 *)ptr;
+ continue;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case BPF_S_LD_H_ABS:
+ k = K;
+load_h:
+ ptr = load_pointer(buf, buflen, k, 2, &tmp);
+ if (ptr != NULL) {
+ A = *(const u16 *)ptr;
+ continue;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case BPF_S_LD_B_ABS:
+ k = K;
+load_b:
+ ptr = load_pointer(buf, buflen, k, 1, &tmp);
+ if (ptr != NULL) {
+ A = *(const u8 *)ptr;
+ continue;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN:
+ A = buflen;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_LDX_W_LEN:
+ X = buflen;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_LD_W_IND:
+ k = X + K;
+ goto load_w;
+ case BPF_S_LD_H_IND:
+ k = X + K;
+ goto load_h;
+ case BPF_S_LD_B_IND:
+ k = X + K;
+ goto load_b;
+ case BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH:
+ ptr = load_pointer(buf, buflen, K, 1, &tmp);
+ if (ptr != NULL) {
+ X = (*(u8 *)ptr & 0xf) << 2;
+ continue;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case BPF_S_LD_IMM:
+ A = K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_LDX_IMM:
+ X = K;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_LD_MEM:
+ A = mem[K];
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_LDX_MEM:
+ X = mem[K];
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_MISC_TAX:
+ X = A;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_MISC_TXA:
+ A = X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_RET_K:
+ return K;
+ case BPF_S_RET_A:
+ return A;
+ case BPF_S_ST:
+ mem[K] = A;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_STX:
+ mem[K] = X;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_S_ANC_PROTOCOL:
+ case BPF_S_ANC_PKTTYPE:
+ case BPF_S_ANC_IFINDEX:
+ case BPF_S_ANC_MARK:
+ case BPF_S_ANC_QUEUE:
+ case BPF_S_ANC_HATYPE:
+ case BPF_S_ANC_RXHASH:
+ case BPF_S_ANC_CPU:
+ case BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR:
+ case BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST:
+ /* ignored */
+ continue;
+ default:
+ WARN_RATELIMIT(1, "Unknown code:%u jt:%u tf:%u k:%u\n",
+ fentry->code, fentry->jt,
+ fentry->jf, fentry->k);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 481611f..77f2eda 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1783,6 +1783,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
break;
+ case PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER:
+ error = prctl_attach_seccomp_filter((char __user *)
+ arg2);
+ break;
case PR_GET_TSC:
error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
break;
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 51bd5a0..77b1106 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -84,6 +84,18 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config SECCOMP_FILTER
+ bool "Enable seccomp-based system call filtering"
+ select SECCOMP
+ depends on EXPERIMENTAL
+ help
+ This kernel feature expands CONFIG_SECCOMP to allow computing
+ in environments with reduced kernel access dictated by a system
+ call filter, expressed in BPF, installed by the application itself
+ through prctl(2).
+
+ See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for more detail.
+
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on SYSFS
--
1.7.5.4
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