On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:47 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 01/12, Steven Rostedt wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, 2012-01-12 at 17:14 +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>>
>> > May be this needs something like LSM_UNSAFE_SECCOMP, or perhaps
>> > cap_bprm_set_creds() should take seccomp.mode == 2 into account, I dunno.
>> >
>> > OTOH, currently seccomp.mode == 1 doesn't allow to exec at all.
>>
>> I've never used seccomp, so I admit I'm totally ignorant on this topic.
>
> me too ;)
>
>> But looking at seccomp from the outside, the biggest advantage to this
>> would be the ability for normal processes to be able to limit tasks it
>> kicks off. If I want to run a task in a sandbox, I don't want to be root
>> to do so.
>>
>> I guess a web browser doesn't perform an exec to run java programs. But
>> it would be nice if I could execute something from the command line that
>> I could run in a sand box.
>>
>> What's the problem with making sure that the setuid isn't set before
>> doing an execv? Only fail when setuid (or some other magic) is enabled
>> on the file being exec'd.
>
> I agree. That is why I mentioned LSM_UNSAFE_SECCOMP/cap_bprm_set_creds.
> Just I do not know what would be the most simple/clean way to do this.
>
>
> And in any case I agree that the current seccomp_check_exec() looks
> strange. Btw, it does
> {
> if (current->seccomp.mode != 2)
> return 0;
> /* We can rely on the task refcount for the filter. */
> if (!current->seccomp.filter)
> return -EPERM;
>
> How it is possible to have seccomp.filter == NULL with mode == 2?
It shouldn't be. It's another relic I missed from development. (Adding to v3 :)
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