On Fri, Sep 16, 2011 at 10:11:46PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
...
>
> Yep, with CAP_SYS_ADMIN check there should be no issues here.
>
> Reviewed-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
Here we go. Andrew, should I resend the whole series (ie two patches?)
Cyrill
---
From: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [PATCH] fs, proc: Introduce the /proc/<pid>/map_files/ directory v14
This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains symlinks
one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end",
the target is the file. Opening a symlink results in a file that point exactly
to the same inode as them vma's one.
For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
| lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
This *helps* checkpointing process in three ways:
1. When dumping a task mappings we do know exact file that is mapped by particular
region. We do this by opening /proc/$pid/map_files/$address symlink the way we do
with file descriptors.
2. This also helps in determining which anonymous shared mappings are shared with
each other by comparing the inodes of them.
3. When restoring a set of processes in case two of them has a mapping shared, we map
the memory by the 1st one and then open its /proc/$pid/map_files/$address file and
map it by the 2nd task.
Using /proc/$pid/maps for this is quite inconvenient since it brings repeatable
re-reading and reparsing for this text file which slows down restore procedure
significantly. Also as being pointed in (3) it is a way easier to use top level
shared mapping in children as /proc/$pid/map_files/$address when needed.
v2: (spotted by Tejun Heo)
- /proc/<pid>/mfd changed to /proc/<pid>/map_files
- find_vma helper is used instead of linear search
- routines are re-grouped
- d_revalidate is set now
v3:
- d_revalidate reworked, now it should drops no longer valid dentries (Tejun Heo)
- ptrace_may_access added into proc_map_files_lookup (Vasiliy Kulikov)
- because of filldir (which eventually might need to lock mmap_sem)
the proc_map_files_readdir() was reworked to call proc_fill_cache()
with unlocked mmap_sem
v4: (feedback by Tejun Heo and Vasiliy Kulikov)
- instead of saving data in proc_inode we rather make a dentry name
to keep both vm_start and vm_end accordingly
- d_revalidate now honor task credentials
v5: (feedback by Kirill A. Shutemov)
- don't forget to release mmap_sem on error path
v6:
- sizeof get used in map_files_info which shrink member a bit on
x86-32 (by Kirill A. Shutemov)
- map_name_to_addr returns -EINVAL instead of -1
which is more appropriate (by Tejun Heo)
v7:
- add [get/set]attr handlers for
proc_map_files_inode_operations (by Vasiliy Kulikov)
v8:
- Kirill A. Shutemov spotted a parasite semicolon
which ruined the ptrace_check call, fixed.
v9: (feedback by Andrew Morton)
- find_exact_vma moved into include/linux/mm.h as an inline helper
- proc_map_files_setattr uses either kmalloc or vmalloc depending
on how many objects are to be allocated
- no more map_name_to_addr but dname_to_vma_addr introduced instead
and it uses sscanf because in one case the find_exact_vma() is used
only to confirm existence of vma area the boolean flag is used
- fancy justification dropped
- still the proc_map_files_get/setattr leaved untouched
until additional fd/ patches applied first.
v10: (feedback by Andrew Morton)
- flex_arrays are used instead of kmalloc/vmalloc calls
- map_files_d_revalidate use ptrace_may_access for
security reason (by Vasiliy Kulikov)
v11:
- should use fput and drop !ret test from a loop code
(feedback by Andrew Morton)
- no need for 'used' variable, use existing
nr_files with file->pos predicate
- if preallocation fails no need to go further,
simply release mmap semaphore and jump out
v12:
- rework map_files_d_revalidate to make sure
the task get released on return (by Vasiliy Kulikov)
v13:
- proc_map_files_inode_operations are set to be the same
as proc_fd_inode_operations, ie to include .permission
pointing to proc_fd_permission
v14: (by Vasiliy Kulikov)
- for security reason map_files/ entries are allowed for
readers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials granted only
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 345 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/mm.h | 12 +
2 files changed, 357 insertions(+)
Index: linux-2.6.git/fs/proc/base.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.git.orig/fs/proc/base.c
+++ linux-2.6.git/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDWALL
#include <asm/hardwall.h>
#endif
@@ -133,6 +134,8 @@ struct pid_entry {
NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \
{ .proc_show = show } )
+static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
+
/*
* Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
* and .. links.
@@ -2201,6 +2204,347 @@ static const struct file_operations proc
};
/*
+ * dname_to_vma_addr - maps a dentry name into two unsigned longs
+ * which represent vma start and end addresses.
+ */
+static int dname_to_vma_addr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
+{
+ if (sscanf(dentry->d_name.name, "%lx-%lx", start, end) != 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_start, vm_end;
+ bool exact_vma_exists = false;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ int status = 0;
+
+ if (nd && nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
+ return -ECHILD;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ status = -EACCES;
+ goto out_notask;
+ }
+
+ inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (!task)
+ goto out_notask;
+
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ goto out;
+
+ mm = get_task_mm(task);
+ if (!mm)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end)) {
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ exact_vma_exists = !!find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ }
+
+ mmput(mm);
+
+ if (exact_vma_exists) {
+ if (task_dumpable(task)) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ cred = __task_cred(task);
+ inode->i_uid = cred->euid;
+ inode->i_gid = cred->egid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ } else {
+ inode->i_uid = 0;
+ inode->i_gid = 0;
+ }
+ security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
+ status = 1;
+ }
+
+out:
+ put_task_struct(task);
+
+out_notask:
+ if (status <= 0)
+ d_drop(dentry);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static const struct dentry_operations tid_map_files_dentry_operations = {
+ .d_revalidate = map_files_d_revalidate,
+ .d_delete = pid_delete_dentry,
+};
+
+static int proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_start, vm_end;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ task = get_proc_task(dentry->d_inode);
+ if (!task)
+ goto out;
+
+ mm = get_task_mm(task);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ if (!mm)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_mmput;
+
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end);
+ if (vma && vma->vm_file) {
+ *path = vma->vm_file->f_path;
+ path_get(path);
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+out_mmput:
+ mmput(mm);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct map_files_info {
+ struct file *file;
+ unsigned long len;
+ unsigned char name[4*sizeof(long)+2]; /* max: %lx-%lx\0 */
+};
+
+static struct dentry *
+proc_map_files_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
+{
+ const struct file *file = ptr;
+ struct proc_inode *ei;
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ if (!file)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+
+ inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
+ if (!inode)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+
+ ei = PROC_I(inode);
+ ei->op.proc_get_link = proc_map_files_get_link;
+
+ inode->i_op = &proc_pid_link_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_size = 64;
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+ inode->i_mode |= S_IRUSR;
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ inode->i_mode |= S_IWUSR;
+
+ d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_map_files_dentry_operations);
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_start, vm_end;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ struct dentry *result;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+
+ result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ goto out;
+
+ result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+ task = get_proc_task(dir);
+ if (!task)
+ goto out;
+
+ result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+ if (lock_trace(task))
+ goto out_put_task;
+
+ result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+ if (dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end))
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ mm = get_task_mm(task);
+ if (!mm)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end);
+ if (!vma)
+ goto out_no_vma;
+
+ result = proc_map_files_instantiate(dir, dentry, task, vma->vm_file);
+
+out_no_vma:
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ mmput(mm);
+out_unlock:
+ unlock_trace(task);
+out_put_task:
+ put_task_struct(task);
+out:
+ return result;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations proc_map_files_inode_operations = {
+ .lookup = proc_map_files_lookup,
+ .permission = proc_fd_permission,
+ .setattr = proc_setattr,
+};
+
+static int proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *filp, void *dirent, filldir_t filldir)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry;
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ ino_t ino;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (!task)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ if (lock_trace(task))
+ goto out_put_task;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ switch (filp->f_pos) {
+ case 0:
+ ino = inode->i_ino;
+ if (filldir(dirent, ".", 1, 0, ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ filp->f_pos++;
+ case 1:
+ ino = parent_ino(dentry);
+ if (filldir(dirent, "..", 2, 1, ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ filp->f_pos++;
+ default:
+ {
+ unsigned long nr_files, pos, i;
+ struct flex_array *fa = NULL;
+ struct map_files_info info;
+ struct map_files_info *p;
+
+ mm = get_task_mm(task);
+ if (!mm)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ nr_files = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We need two passes here:
+ *
+ * 1) Collect vmas of mapped files with mmap_sem taken
+ * 2) Release mmap_sem and instantiate entries
+ *
+ * otherwise we get lockdep complained, since filldir()
+ * routine might require mmap_sem taken in might_fault().
+ */
+
+ for (vma = mm->mmap, pos = 2; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ if (vma->vm_file && ++pos > filp->f_pos)
+ nr_files++;
+ }
+
+ if (nr_files) {
+ fa = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(info), nr_files, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fa || flex_array_prealloc(fa, 0, nr_files, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (fa)
+ flex_array_free(fa);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ mmput(mm);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ for (i = 0, vma = mm->mmap, pos = 2; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ if (!vma->vm_file)
+ continue;
+ if (++pos <= filp->f_pos)
+ continue;
+
+ get_file(vma->vm_file);
+ info.file = vma->vm_file;
+ info.len = snprintf(info.name, sizeof(info.name),
+ "%lx-%lx", vma->vm_start,
+ vma->vm_end);
+ if (flex_array_put(fa, i++, &info, GFP_KERNEL))
+ BUG();
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_files; i++) {
+ p = flex_array_get(fa, i);
+ ret = proc_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir,
+ p->name, p->len,
+ proc_map_files_instantiate,
+ task, p->file);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ filp->f_pos++;
+ fput(p->file);
+ }
+ for (; i < nr_files; i++) {
+ /*
+ * In case of error don't forget
+ * to put rest of file refs.
+ */
+ p = flex_array_get(fa, i);
+ fput(p->file);
+ }
+ if (fa)
+ flex_array_free(fa);
+ mmput(mm);
+ }
+ }
+
+out_unlock:
+ unlock_trace(task);
+out_put_task:
+ put_task_struct(task);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_map_files_operations = {
+ .read = generic_read_dir,
+ .readdir = proc_map_files_readdir,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
* /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
* access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
*/
@@ -2815,6 +3159,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations pro
static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
DIR("task", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_task_inode_operations, proc_task_operations),
DIR("fd", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fd_inode_operations, proc_fd_operations),
+ DIR("map_files", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_map_files_inode_operations, proc_map_files_operations),
DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations),
DIR("ns", S_IRUSR|S_IXUGO, proc_ns_dir_inode_operations, proc_ns_dir_operations),
#ifdef CONFIG_NET
Index: linux-2.6.git/include/linux/mm.h
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.git.orig/include/linux/mm.h
+++ linux-2.6.git/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -1491,6 +1491,18 @@ static inline unsigned long vma_pages(st
return (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
+/* Look up the first VMA which exactly match the interval vm_start ... vm_end */
+static inline struct vm_area_struct *
+find_exact_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vm_start, unsigned long vm_end)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, vm_start);
+
+ if (vma && (vma->vm_start != vm_start || vma->vm_end != vm_end))
+ vma = NULL;
+
+ return vma;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags);
#else
--
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