Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Mon 2009-09-28 18:04:10, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > a) the current permission model under /proc/PID/fd has a security
> > hole (which Jamie is worried about)
>
> I believe its bugtraq time. Being able to reopen file with additional
> permissions looks like a security problem...
>
> Jamie, do you have some test script? And do you want your 15 minutes
> of bugtraq fame? ;-).
$ mkdir secret
$ exec 3>> secret/appendonly.txt
$ chmod 000 secret # This is not changed during do_stuff
jamie@amile:~/test$ echo START OF LOG 1>&3
$ do_stuff 1>&3
cat: secret/appendonly.txt: Permission denied # A good sign
$ chmod 755 secret
$ cat secret/appendonly.txt # Let's see our log
nothing to see here # What's that doing there??!
You can re-open a deleted file with increased permisssions. That's
probably more subversive:
$ exec >>appendonlydeleted.txt
$ exec 4<appendonlydeleted.txt # I'll read it later.
$ echo START OF LOG
$ ./do_stuff
$ cat 0<&4 >/dev/tty
nothing to see here # How did they do that?!
How'd it happen?
do_stuff:
#!/bin/sh
echo some text getting logged...
echo more text...
echo no wait, let\'s subvert the append flag!
echo nothing to see here >/proc/self/fd/1
If /proc/self/fd/1 were a _real_ symbolic link, that wouldn't work.
The reopen does check the inode permission, but it does not require
you have any reachable path to the file. Someone _might_ use that as
a traditional unix security mechanism, but if so it's probably quite rare.
If converting append-only to writable doesn't sound too bad, you can
convert read-only to writable and write-only to readable. Gaining
write access to a deleted file which you only received a read-only
descriptor for sounds dodgy to me:
$ echo secret5948043853048 >secret_readonly_password.txt
$ exec 3<secret_readonly_password.txt
$ rm secret_readonly_password.txt # Now I'm sure nobody can change it!
$ echo all your base ha ha >/proc/self/fd/3
$ cat 0<&3
all your base ha ha # Oh dear, my assumption was broken.
Did you really think you had to "chmod 444" before deleting the file?
-- Jamie
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