On Mon, 28 Sep 2009, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Sep 28, 2009 12:25 +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > BTW I just checked, and it is possible to re-open or promote an fd
> > opened with O_NODE like this:
> >
> > char tmp[64];
> >
> > fd = open(filename, O_NODE | O_NOACCESS);
> > /* ... */
> > sprintf(tmp, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
> > fd_rw = open(tmp, O_RDWR);
> >
> > Now fd_rw is guaranteed to refer to the same inode as fd.
>
> It seems very unpleasant to require applications using O_NODE to
> reopen files using /proc.
The point of the above example was that reopening a file descriptor
with upgraded (or downgraded) access mode is even now possible. Which
either means:
a) the current permission model under /proc/PID/fd has a security
hole (which Jamie is worried about)
b) we can safely implement this with by changing openat() semantics,
or even with a new reopen() syscall
I'm not too worried about the security aspect of this, but it's
something to keep in mind.
Thanks,
Miklos
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