Re: [PATCH 2/3] fs: Allow user to lock mount attributes with mount_setattr

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On Wed, Aug 16, 2023 at 4:36 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 16, 2023 at 06:56:25PM +1000, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> > On 2023-08-16, Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 06:46:33AM -0700, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 2:30 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 02:00:43AM -0700, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> > > > > > We support locking certain mount attributes in the kernel. This API
> > > > > > isn't directly exposed to users. Right now, users can lock mount
> > > > > > attributes by going through the process of creating a new user
> > > > > > namespaces, and when the mounts are copied to the "lower privilege"
> > > > > > domain, they're locked. The mount can be reopened, and passed around
> > > > > > as a "locked mount".
> > > > >
> > > > > Not sure if that's what you're getting at but you can actually fully
> > > > > create these locked mounts already:
> > > > >
> > > > > P1                                                 P2
> > > > > # init userns + init mountns                       # init userns + init mountns
> > > > > sudo mount --bind /foo /bar
> > > > > sudo mount --bind -o ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec /bar
> > > > >
> > > > > # unprivileged userns + unprivileged mountns
> > > > > unshare --mount --user --map-root
> > > > >
> > > > > mount --bind -oremount
> > > > >
> > > > > fd = open_tree(/bar, OPEN_TREE_CLONE)
> > > > >
> > > > > send(fd_send, P2);
> > > > >
> > > > >                                                    recv(&fd_recv, P1)
> > > > >
> > > > >                                                    move_mount(fd_recv, /locked-mnt);
> > > > >
> > > > > and now you have a fully locked mount on the host for P2. Did you mean that?
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Yep. Doing this within a program without clone / fork is awkward. Forking and
> > > > unsharing in random C++ programs doesn't always go super well, so in my
> > > > mind it'd be nice to have an API to do this directly.
> > > >
> > > > In addition, having the superblock continue to be owned by the userns that
> > > > its mounted in is nice because then they can toggle the other mount attributes
> > > > (nodev, nosuid, noexec are the ones we care about).
> > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Locked mounts are useful, for example, in container execution without
> > > > > > user namespaces, where you may want to expose some host data as read
> > > > > > only without allowing the container to remount the mount as mutable.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The API currently requires that the given privilege is taken away
> > > > > > while or before locking the flag in the less privileged position.
> > > > > > This could be relaxed in the future, where the user is allowed to
> > > > > > remount the mount as read only, but once they do, they cannot make
> > > > > > it read only again.
> > > > >
> > > > > s/read only/read write/
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Right now, this allows for all flags that are lockable via the
> > > > > > userns unshare trick to be locked, other than the atime related
> > > > > > ones. This is because the semantics of what the "less privileged"
> > > > > > position is around the atime flags is unclear.
> > > > >
> > > > > I think that atime stuff doesn't really make sense to expose to
> > > > > userspace. That seems a bit pointless imho.
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > >  fs/namespace.c             | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > > > > >  include/uapi/linux/mount.h |  2 ++
> > > > > >  2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> > > > > > index 54847db5b819..5396e544ac84 100644
> > > > > > --- a/fs/namespace.c
> > > > > > +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> > > > > > @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static LIST_HEAD(ex_mountpoints); /* protected by namespace_sem */
> > > > > >  struct mount_kattr {
> > > > > >       unsigned int attr_set;
> > > > > >       unsigned int attr_clr;
> > > > > > +     unsigned int attr_lock;
> > > > >
> > > > > So when I originally noted down this crazy idea
> > > > > https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features
> > > > > I didn't envision a new struct member but rather a flag that could be
> > > > > raised in attr_set like MOUNT_ATTR_LOCK that would indicate for the
> > > > > other flags in attr_set to become locked.
> > > > >
> > > > > So if we could avoid growing the struct pointlessly I'd prefer that. Is
> > > > > there a reason that wouldn't work?
> > > > No reason. The semantics were just a little more awkward, IMHO.
> > > > Specifically:
> > > > * This attr could never be cleared, only set, which didn't seem to follow
> > > > the attr_set / attr_clr semantics
> > > > * If we ever introduced a mount_getattr call, you'd want to expose
> > > > each of the locked bits independently, I'd think, and exposing
> > > > that through one flag wouldn't give you the same fidelity.
> > >
> > > Hm, right. So it's either new flags or a new member. @Aleksa?
> >
> > I like ->attr_lock more tbh, especially since they cannot be cleared.
> > They are implemented as mount flags internally, but conceptually locking
> > flags is a separate thing to setting them.
>
> Ok, it'd be neat if could do the sanity review of this api then as you
> know the eventual users probably best.

Aleksa,
What do you think? The biggest miss / frustration with this API is that
there is no way to introspect which flags are locked from userspace,
but given the absence of a mount_getattr syscall (currently), I think
that we can add that later.




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