Re: [PATCH 2/3] fs: Allow user to lock mount attributes with mount_setattr

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On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 06:46:33AM -0700, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 2:30 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 02:00:43AM -0700, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> > > We support locking certain mount attributes in the kernel. This API
> > > isn't directly exposed to users. Right now, users can lock mount
> > > attributes by going through the process of creating a new user
> > > namespaces, and when the mounts are copied to the "lower privilege"
> > > domain, they're locked. The mount can be reopened, and passed around
> > > as a "locked mount".
> >
> > Not sure if that's what you're getting at but you can actually fully
> > create these locked mounts already:
> >
> > P1                                                 P2
> > # init userns + init mountns                       # init userns + init mountns
> > sudo mount --bind /foo /bar
> > sudo mount --bind -o ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec /bar
> >
> > # unprivileged userns + unprivileged mountns
> > unshare --mount --user --map-root
> >
> > mount --bind -oremount
> >
> > fd = open_tree(/bar, OPEN_TREE_CLONE)
> >
> > send(fd_send, P2);
> >
> >                                                    recv(&fd_recv, P1)
> >
> >                                                    move_mount(fd_recv, /locked-mnt);
> >
> > and now you have a fully locked mount on the host for P2. Did you mean that?
> >
> 
> Yep. Doing this within a program without clone / fork is awkward. Forking and
> unsharing in random C++ programs doesn't always go super well, so in my
> mind it'd be nice to have an API to do this directly.
> 
> In addition, having the superblock continue to be owned by the userns that
> its mounted in is nice because then they can toggle the other mount attributes
> (nodev, nosuid, noexec are the ones we care about).
> 
> > >
> > > Locked mounts are useful, for example, in container execution without
> > > user namespaces, where you may want to expose some host data as read
> > > only without allowing the container to remount the mount as mutable.
> > >
> > > The API currently requires that the given privilege is taken away
> > > while or before locking the flag in the less privileged position.
> > > This could be relaxed in the future, where the user is allowed to
> > > remount the mount as read only, but once they do, they cannot make
> > > it read only again.
> >
> > s/read only/read write/
> >
> > >
> > > Right now, this allows for all flags that are lockable via the
> > > userns unshare trick to be locked, other than the atime related
> > > ones. This is because the semantics of what the "less privileged"
> > > position is around the atime flags is unclear.
> >
> > I think that atime stuff doesn't really make sense to expose to
> > userspace. That seems a bit pointless imho.
> >
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > ---
> > >  fs/namespace.c             | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > >  include/uapi/linux/mount.h |  2 ++
> > >  2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> > > index 54847db5b819..5396e544ac84 100644
> > > --- a/fs/namespace.c
> > > +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> > > @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static LIST_HEAD(ex_mountpoints); /* protected by namespace_sem */
> > >  struct mount_kattr {
> > >       unsigned int attr_set;
> > >       unsigned int attr_clr;
> > > +     unsigned int attr_lock;
> >
> > So when I originally noted down this crazy idea
> > https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features
> > I didn't envision a new struct member but rather a flag that could be
> > raised in attr_set like MOUNT_ATTR_LOCK that would indicate for the
> > other flags in attr_set to become locked.
> >
> > So if we could avoid growing the struct pointlessly I'd prefer that. Is
> > there a reason that wouldn't work?
> No reason. The semantics were just a little more awkward, IMHO.
> Specifically:
> * This attr could never be cleared, only set, which didn't seem to follow
> the attr_set / attr_clr semantics
> * If we ever introduced a mount_getattr call, you'd want to expose
> each of the locked bits independently, I'd think, and exposing
> that through one flag wouldn't give you the same fidelity.

Hm, right. So it's either new flags or a new member. @Aleksa?



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