On Sat, Jun 24, 2023 at 12:30:47PM +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote: > All other files in /proc/$PID/ use proc_setattr(). > > Not using it allows the usage of chmod() on /proc/$PID/net, even on > other processes owned by the same user. > The same would probably also be true for other attributes to be changed. > > As this technically represents an ABI change it is not marked for > stable so any unlikely regressions are caught during a full release cycle. > > Fixes: e9720acd728a ("[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3)") > Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > fs/proc/proc_net.c | 1 + > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) > > diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_net.c b/fs/proc/proc_net.c > index a0c0419872e3..78f9e6b469c0 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/proc_net.c > +++ b/fs/proc/proc_net.c > @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ static int proc_tgid_net_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > const struct inode_operations proc_net_inode_operations = { > .lookup = proc_tgid_net_lookup, > .getattr = proc_tgid_net_getattr, > + .setattr = proc_setattr, > }; > > static int proc_tgid_net_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) So your concern really is specifically about /proc/$pid/net itself as that's owned by the user and thus the user itself can chmod it and thus also restrict access for other processess running with the same uid: chmod 0000 /proc/1234/net ls -al /proc/self/net ls: cannot open directory '/proc/self/net/': Permission denied Yeah, it's not a huge deal but it's arguably a bug especially since the original commit from 2006 that introduced proc_setattr() was clear that it should apply to anything beneath /proc/<pid>/ owned by the user. So I agree and we should probably try and have the same behavior for /proc/$pid/net as well. We can see if that breaks something.