Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx): ... > Your suggestion is the equivalent of knowing that your friend John might > look in your window to see if you are home but shouldn't ever try to > kick down the door. In the current situation you can't tell the > difference between the window and the door so you won't call the police > even if John tries to kick down the door. I don't buy this analogy, unless there a side effect to a failed open() which I'm not thinking of? > When in reality it would be a > lot better to not call the police if John looks in the window even > though you don't know his intent. He might be looking in the window to > see if you are home and if not he'll try to kick down the door. But > that situation of not knowing his intent and still not always calling > the policy is a heck of a lot better than NEVER calling the police. And > I'm glad you see my side of the SELinux argument that this dontaudit > needs to be per domain, not global for all access calls, since knowing Yes. It should be distinguishable per domain (and it is, using dontaudit, right?). But I don't yet see any reason why it's worth distinguishing between access() and open(). > John might look in the window has nothing to do with Jake and we > probably want to call the policy if he does either! > > Often the right thing to do here is to fix the application to not > request things it doesn't need, but at least in the case of Nautilus it > needs to learn everything just so it can draw it's icons, not much we > can do about that example. If policy lets Nautilus poke around all under /usr without auditing, then it (and anyone who attacks it) gets to do that... catching opens and not accesses doesn't imo buy you anything. -serge -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
