Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx): > 3) I've also heard it hinted that we could do this with audit by just > having audit drop the denials that include the access(2) syscall and the > scontext and tcontext for the slew of things the SELinux policy writers > know we are not interested in. And while it seems good, now we have What is the difference whether an attacker does access(2) to check for /etc/shadow rights, or does a failed open()? Either you care that someone is poking around, or you don't. Right? > SELinux 'policy' in places other than the policy, harder to distribute, > and it requires that everyone who turns on SELinux also turns on syscall > auditing with its associated overhead. > > Obviously I think the right thing to decide if an LSM wants to send a > denial message or not is the LSM. The only problem I have is that the > LSM doesn't know today when it is getting different types or requests > and so can't make that decision. I think the problem is that you want to guess the intent, and you can't do that. Knowing that a process did access instead of open really isn't sufficient. -serge -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
