On 2020-05-13 12:39 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Wed, 2020-05-13 at 12:18 -0700, Scott Branden wrote:
On 2020-05-13 12:03 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Wed, 2020-05-13 at 11:53 -0700, Scott Branden wrote:
Even if the kernel successfully verified the firmware file signature it
would just be wasting its time. The kernel in these use cases is not always
trusted. The device needs to authenticate the firmware image itself.
There are also environments where the kernel is trusted and limits the
firmware being provided to the device to one which they signed.
The device firmware is being downloaded piecemeal from somewhere and
won't be measured?
It doesn't need to be measured for current driver needs.
Sure the device doesn't need the kernel measuring the firmware, but
hardened environments do measure firmware.
If someone has such need the infrastructure could be added to the kernel
at a later date. Existing functionality is not broken in any way by
this patch series.
Wow! You're saying that your patch set takes precedence over the
existing expectations and can break them.
Huh? I said existing functionality is NOT broken by this patch series.
Mimi
