On Sun, Aug 18, 2019 at 09:16:38AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > Ted's observation was about maliciously-crafted filesystems, though, so > integrity-only features such as metadata checksums are irrelevant. Also the > filesystem version is irrelevant; anything accepted by the kernel code (even if I think allowing users to mount file systems (any of ours) without privilege is a rather bad idea. But that doesn't mean we should not be as robust as we can. Optionally disabling support for legacy formats at compile and/or runtime is something we should actively look into as well. > it's legacy/deprecated) is open attack surface. > > I personally consider it *mandatory* that we deal with this stuff. But I can > understand that we don't do a good job at it, so we shouldn't hold a new > filesystem to an unfairly high standard relative to other filesystems... I very much disagree. We can't really force anyone to fix up old file systems. But we can very much hold new ones to (slightly) higher standards. Thats the only way to get the average quality up. Some as for things like code style - we can't magically fix up all old stuff, but we can and usually do hold new code to higher standards. (Often not to standards as high as I'd personally prefer, btw).
