On Mon, 18 Jul 2016 11:45:53 -0400 (EDT)
Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, 18 Jul 2016, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
>
> > On Sun, 17 Jul 2016 23:31:56 -0400
> > Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > > Let's take the simple and obvious approach by decompressing the binary
> > > into a kernel buffer and then copying it to user space. Those who are
> > > looking for more performance on a MMU system are unlikely to choose this
> > > executable format anyway.
> >
> > The flat loader takes a very casual attitude to overruns and corrupted
> > binaries. It's after all MMUless so has no real security model. If you
> > enable flat for an MMU system then IMHO those all need to be fixed
> > including all the missing overflow checks on the maths on textlen and the
> > like.
>
> What about the following patch? This with existing user accessors and
> allocation error checks should cover it all.
>
> ----- >8
> commit cc1051c9c57202772568600e96b75229a2a7cf19
> Author: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Date: Mon Jul 18 11:28:57 2016 -0400
>
> binfmt_flat: prevent kernel dammage from corrupted executable headers
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
> index 24deae4dcb..fa0054c1c3 100644
> --- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c
> +++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
> @@ -498,6 +498,17 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm * bprm,
> }
>
> /*
> + * Make sure the header params are sane.
> + * 28 bits (256 MB) is way more than reasonable in this case.
> + * If some top bits are set we have probable binary corruption.
> + */
> + if ((text_len | data_len | bss_len | stack_len | full_data) >> 28) {
> + printk("BINFMT_FLAT: bad header\n");
Apart from the printk that looks good for the header but I think the rest
could do with a fair bit more review (eg relocations in range checks).
Alan
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
