James Morris wrote: > On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Chris Mason wrote: >>> The incomplete mediation flows from the design, since the pathname-based >>> mediation doesn't generalize to cover all objects unlike label- or >>> attribute-based mediation. And the "use the natural abstraction for >>> each object type" approach likewise doesn't yield any general model or >>> anything that you can analyze systematically for data flow. >>> >> This feels quite a lot like a repeat of the discussion at the kernel >> summit. There are valid uses for path based security, and if they don't >> fit your needs, please don't use them. But, path based semantics alone >> are not a valid reason to shut out AA. >> > The validity or otherwise of pathname access control is not being > discussed here. > > The point is that the pathname model does not generalize, and that > AppArmor's inability to provide adequate coverage of the system is a > design issue arising from this. > The above two paragraphs appear to contradict each other. > Recall that the question asked by Lars was whether there were any > outstanding technical issues relating to AppArmor. > > AppArmor does not and can not provide the level of confinement claimed by > the documentation, and its policy does not reflect its actual confinement > properties. That's kind of a technical issue, right? > So if the document said "confinement with respect to direct file access and POSIX.1e capabilities" and that list got extended as AA got new confinement features, would that address your issue? Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering http://novell.com AppArmor Chat: irc.oftc.net/#apparmor - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
