Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

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On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote:

> A veto is not a technical argument. All technical arguments (except for
> "path name is ugly, yuk yuk!") have been addressed, have they not?

AppArmor doesn't actually provide confinement, because it only operates on 
filesystem objects.

What you define in AppArmor policy does _not_ reflect the actual 
confinement properties of the policy.  Applications can simply use other 
mechanisms to access objects, and the policy is effectively meaningless.

You might define this as a non-technical issue, but the fact that AppArmor 
simply does not and can not work is a fairly significant consideration, I 
would imagine.



- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
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