david@xxxxxxx wrote:
On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Joshua Brindle wrote:
Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote:
On 2007-06-21T16:59:54, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
<snip>
> Um, no. It might not be able to directly open files via that
path, but
> showing that it can never read or write your mail is a rather
different
> matter.
>
Yes. Your use case is different than mine.
So.. your use case is what? If an AA user asked you to protect his
mail from his browser I'm sure you'd truthfully answer "no, we can't
do that but we can protect the path to your mail from your browser"..
I think not. One need only look at the wonderful marketing literature
for AA to see what you are telling people it can do, and your above
statement isn't consistent with that, sorry.
remember, the policies define a white-list
Except for unconfined processes.
so if a hacker wants to have mozilla access the mail files he needs to
get some other process on the sysstem to create a link or move a file
to a path that mozilla does have access to. until that is done there
is no way for mozilla to access the mail through the filesystem.
other programs could be run that would give mozilla access to the mail
contents, but it would be through some other path that the policy
permitted mozilla accessing in the first place.
Or through IPC or the network, that is the point, filesystem only
coverage doesn't cut it; there is no way to say the browser can't access
the users mail in AA, and there never will be.
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