--- Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@xxxxxxx> wrote: > > where the objects referenced by the paths are identical and visible to the > > subject along both paths, in keeping with your description of "policy may > > allow access to some locations but not to others" ? > > I'm not aware of situations where giving different permissions to different > paths to the same file would actually be useful. The security model doesn't > prevent it though, and it's not a security hole. On Fedora zcat, gzip and gunzip are all links to the same file. I can imagine (although it is a bit of a stretch) allowing a set of users access to gunzip but not gzip (or the other way around). There are probably more sophisticated programs that have different behavior based on the name they're invoked by that would provide a more compelling arguement, assuming of course that you buy into the behavior-based-on-name scheme. What I think I'm suggesting is that AppArmor might be useful in addressing the fact that a file with multiple hard links is necessarily constrained to have the same access control on each of those names. That assumes one believes that such behavior is flawwed, and I'm not going to try to argue that. The question was about an example, and there is one. Casey Schaufler casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
