On Fri, 21 Jul 2023 at 16:14, Luca Boccassi <bluca@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, 21 Jul 2023 at 14:34, James Bottomley > <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Fri, 2023-07-21 at 14:10 +0100, Luca Boccassi wrote: > > > On Fri, 21 Jul 2023 at 14:01, James Bottomley > > > <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > [...] > > > > Well, my job is to be concerned about how individuals who want to > > > > own their own keys, either in MoK or db, participate in this, so I > > > > am mostly thinking about local signing. Whatever we decide, there > > > > must be a local workflow pathway. > > > > > > Sure but for local signing via MoK that's obviously fine, as one gets > > > to keep the pieces. AFAIK it's a different flow in Shim whether > > > something is authorized by MoK, DB or the built-in cert, so having > > > different policies built-in for those different cases should be > > > doable. Actually at the moment even if Shim loads the image, if it > > > gets authorized by DB .sbat isn't checked at all. > > > > So let's be sure we mean the same thing here. There is really no third > > party CA. Microsoft gives the distributions a signing key to allow > > them to sign their version of shim. Some distributions, like Red Hat, > > also embed their signing certificates in shim, so shim can distinguish > > between a RH key and another key added to MokList. However, some > > distributions, like SUSE, insist that all signing keys be approved by > > the machine owner (so no embedded shim certs for non-enterprise) and > > their shim can't distinguish between SUSE keys and machine owner > > additions. Given the variances in key handling, I think trying to > > distinguish between official and developer keys is a huge addition of > > complexity we don't need, so there has to be a workflow that functions > > for both and that workflow would seem to be allowing non-existent or > > empty sbat sections. Official key holders would *always* add sbat > > sections, so there's really no problem that needs a solution to be > > mandated here. > > The certificate is called the "Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011" , > issued by the "Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root". So > for short, we call it UEFI 3rd party CA :-) > Anyway, I wasn't aware that SUSE doesn't embed their cert in Shim, > we'll have to take that in consideration for sure. Actually, a dev from SUSE's security just confirmed they embed their CA in Shim like every other distribution. Nobody seems to be aware of any example where a distribution relies exclusively on MoK - and that's understandable, as that would mean failing to boot by default on a new machine. Do you have any example/cases where that's actually happening? Outside development/local signing/etc.
