On Fri, 2023-07-21 at 14:10 +0100, Luca Boccassi wrote: > On Fri, 21 Jul 2023 at 14:01, James Bottomley > <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: [...] > > Well, my job is to be concerned about how individuals who want to > > own their own keys, either in MoK or db, participate in this, so I > > am mostly thinking about local signing. Whatever we decide, there > > must be a local workflow pathway. > > Sure but for local signing via MoK that's obviously fine, as one gets > to keep the pieces. AFAIK it's a different flow in Shim whether > something is authorized by MoK, DB or the built-in cert, so having > different policies built-in for those different cases should be > doable. Actually at the moment even if Shim loads the image, if it > gets authorized by DB .sbat isn't checked at all. So let's be sure we mean the same thing here. There is really no third party CA. Microsoft gives the distributions a signing key to allow them to sign their version of shim. Some distributions, like Red Hat, also embed their signing certificates in shim, so shim can distinguish between a RH key and another key added to MokList. However, some distributions, like SUSE, insist that all signing keys be approved by the machine owner (so no embedded shim certs for non-enterprise) and their shim can't distinguish between SUSE keys and machine owner additions. Given the variances in key handling, I think trying to distinguish between official and developer keys is a huge addition of complexity we don't need, so there has to be a workflow that functions for both and that workflow would seem to be allowing non-existent or empty sbat sections. Official key holders would *always* add sbat sections, so there's really no problem that needs a solution to be mandated here. James
