Re: [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation

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On 5/12/23 06:47, Matthew Garrett wrote:
On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:11PM +0000, Ross Philipson wrote:
+Secure Launch does not interoperate with KASLR. If possible, the MLE should be
+built with KASLR disabled::

Why does Secure Launch not interoperate with KASLR?

Re: IOMMUs

Until the IOMMU driver comes online, memory is protected by the PMRs regions requested by the Preamble (pre-launch code) in accordance with Intel TXT specifications and configured by the ACM. The KASLR randomizer will run before the IOMMU driver is able to come online and ensure frames used by the kernel are protected as well as frames that a driver may registered in a BAR are not blocked.

+It is recommended that no other command line options should be set to override
+the defaults above.

What happens if they are? Does doing so change the security posture of
the system? If so, will the measurements be different in a way that
demonstrates the system is in an insecure state?


In an early version of the patch series this was enforced when turning on Secure Launch, but concerns were raised over this approach and was asked to allow the user to be able to shoot themselves in the foot. Overriding these values could render either an insecure state and/or an unstable system.



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