On Mon, Oct 03, 2022 at 01:26:25PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> As it turns out, Xen does not guarantee that EFI bootservices data
> regions in memory are preserved, which means that EFI configuration
> tables pointing into such memory regions may be corrupted before the
> dom0 OS has had a chance to inspect them.
>
> Demi Marie reports that this is causing problems for Qubes OS when it
> attempts to perform system firmware updates, which requires that the
> contents of the ESRT configuration table are valid when the fwupd user
> space program runs.
>
> However, other configuration tables such as the memory attributes
> table or the runtime properties table are equally affected, and so we
> need a comprehensive workaround that works for any table type.
>
> So when running under Xen, check the EFI memory descriptor covering the
> start of the table, and disregard the table if it does not reside in
> memory that is preserved by Xen.
>
> Co-developed-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 7 ++++++
> drivers/xen/efi.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/efi.h | 2 ++
> 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> index 2c12b1a06481..0a4583c13a40 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> @@ -560,6 +560,13 @@ static __init int match_config_table(const efi_guid_t *guid,
>
> for (i = 0; efi_guidcmp(table_types[i].guid, NULL_GUID); i++) {
> if (!efi_guidcmp(*guid, table_types[i].guid)) {
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_EFI) &&
> + !xen_efi_config_table_is_usable(guid, table)) {
> + if (table_types[i].name[0])
> + pr_cont("(%s=0x%lx) ",
> + table_types[i].name, table);
> + return 1;
> + }
> *(table_types[i].ptr) = table;
> if (table_types[i].name[0])
> pr_cont("%s=0x%lx ",
> diff --git a/drivers/xen/efi.c b/drivers/xen/efi.c
> index 74f3f6d8cdc8..c275a9c377fe 100644
> --- a/drivers/xen/efi.c
> +++ b/drivers/xen/efi.c
> @@ -326,3 +326,27 @@ int efi_mem_desc_lookup(u64 phys_addr, efi_memory_desc_t *out_md)
>
> return 0;
> }
> +
> +bool __init xen_efi_config_table_is_usable(const efi_guid_t *guid,
> + unsigned long table)
> +{
> + efi_memory_desc_t md;
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_PARAVIRT))
> + return true;
> +
> + rc = efi_mem_desc_lookup(table, &md);
> + if (rc)
> + return false;
> +
> + switch (md.type) {
> + case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE:
> + case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA:
> + case EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY:
> + case EFI_RESERVED_TYPE:
Some firmware uses EFI_ACPI_MEMORY_NVS to store ACPI tables, so this
needs to be added to the allowlist. Otherwise affected systems will not
boot. Xen treats EFI_ACPI_MEMORY_NVS the way it treats
EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY, so this is safe.
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
> index e0ee6f6da4b4..b0cba86352ce 100644
> --- a/include/linux/efi.h
> +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
> @@ -1352,4 +1352,6 @@ struct linux_efi_initrd {
> /* Header of a populated EFI secret area */
> #define EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1e74f542, 0x71dd, 0x4d66, 0x96, 0x3e, 0xef, 0x42, 0x87, 0xff, 0x17, 0x3b)
>
> +bool xen_efi_config_table_is_usable(const efi_guid_t *, unsigned long table);
> +
> #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */
> --
> 2.35.1
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Invisible Things Lab
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