Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown

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On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 14:28 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 03/13/2014 02:24 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> > 
> > If I have CAP_SYS_RAWIO I can make arbitary ring 0 calls from userspace,
> > trivially and in a fashion well known and documented.
> > 
> 
> ... and once we eliminate CAP_SYS_RAWIO a bunch of the patches become
> redundant.

We can only drop CAP_SYS_RAWIO if we change a bunch of the existing
CAP_SYS_RAWIO checks to something else. How do we do that without
breaking existing userspace?

-- 
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
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