On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 21:26 +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> > On the other hand, disabling CAP_SYS_RAWIO *definitely* breaks expected
> > functionality - firmware loading and the fibmap ioctl are probably the
> > most obvious. And changing the use of CAP_SYS_RAWIO potentially breaks
> > userspace expectations, so we're kind of stuck there.
>
> Actually I know how to describe the problem better.
>
> Whitelist v Blacklist.
>
> Going around adding extra cases for CAP_SYS_RAWIO is a fails insecure
> model. Going around adding CAP_SYS_RAWIO || CAP_SYS_RAWIO_SEC is a 'fails
> secure' case.
We've already been through this. We can't add new capabilities. It
breaks existing userspace.
--
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
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