On Sun 2012-11-04 04:28:02, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Sat, Nov 03, 2012 at 10:56:40PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote: > > On Sat, 2012-11-03 at 13:46 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > I... what? Our signed bootloader will boot our signed kernel without any > > > physically present end-user involvement. We therefore need to make it > > > as difficult as practically possible for an attacker to use our signed > > > bootloader and our signed kernel as an attack vector against other > > > operating systems, which includes worrying about hibernate and kexec. If > > > people want to support this use case then patches to deal with that need > > > to be present in the upstream kernel. > > > > Right, but what I'm telling you is that by deciding to allow automatic > > first boot, you're causing the windows attack vector problem. You could > > easily do a present user test only on first boot which would eliminate > > it. Instead, we get all of this. > > Your definition of "Best practices" is "Automated installs are > impossible"? Have you ever actually spoken to a user? Always polite Matthew... Anyway, problem with introducing random signatures all over the kernel is that it does not _work_. You'll end up signing all the userspace, too. So far you want to sign kexec, soon you'll discover you need to sign s2disk, too, and then you realize X, wine and dosemu needs the same treatment. fwvm95 comes next. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
