On Fri, 2 Nov 2012, Vivek Goyal wrote: > > With secure boot enabled, then the kernel should refuse to let an > > unsigned kexec load new images, and kexec itself should refuse to > > load unsigned images. > > Yep, good in theory. Now that basically means reimplementing kexec-tools > in kernel. Why is "when kernel has been securely booted, the in-kernel kexec mechanism has to verify the signature of the supplied image before kexecing it" not enough? (basically the same thing we are doing for signed modules already). -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
