> -----Original Message----- > From: Greg KH [mailto:gregkh@xxxxxxx] > Sent: Saturday, October 29, 2011 2:34 AM > To: KY Srinivasan > Cc: Jiri Kosina; linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; > virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx; ohering@xxxxxxxx; Dmitry Torokhov > Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Staging: hv: Move the mouse driver out of staging > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 08:28:11PM +0000, KY Srinivasan wrote: > > > > The guest cannot survive a malicious host; so I think it is safe to say that the > > > > guest can assume the host is following the protocol. > > > > > > That's not good for a very large number of reasons, not the least being > > > that we have no idea how secure the hyperv hypervisor is, so making it > > > so that there isn't an obvious hole into linux through it, would be a > > > good idea. > > > > > > And yes, I'd say the same thing if this was a KVM or Xen driver as well. > > > Please be very defensive in this area of the code, especially as there > > > are no performance issues here. > > > > In the chain of trust, the hypervisor and the host are the foundations > > as far as the guest is concerned, since both the hypervisor and the host > > can affect the guest in ways that the guest has no obvious way to protect itself. > > That's true. > > > If the hypervisor/host have security holes, there is not much you can do in the > guest > > to deal with it. > > In this case, I can add checks but I am not sure how useful it is. > > I would prefer to see them here, just to be safe, it can not hurt, > right? I have added a check in the patches I sent out yesterday. Regards, K. Y > > > greg k-h _______________________________________________ devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://driverdev.linuxdriverproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
