On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 08:28:11PM +0000, KY Srinivasan wrote: > > > The guest cannot survive a malicious host; so I think it is safe to say that the > > > guest can assume the host is following the protocol. > > > > That's not good for a very large number of reasons, not the least being > > that we have no idea how secure the hyperv hypervisor is, so making it > > so that there isn't an obvious hole into linux through it, would be a > > good idea. > > > > And yes, I'd say the same thing if this was a KVM or Xen driver as well. > > Please be very defensive in this area of the code, especially as there > > are no performance issues here. > > In the chain of trust, the hypervisor and the host are the foundations > as far as the guest is concerned, since both the hypervisor and the host > can affect the guest in ways that the guest has no obvious way to protect itself. That's true. > If the hypervisor/host have security holes, there is not much you can do in the guest > to deal with it. > In this case, I can add checks but I am not sure how useful it is. I would prefer to see them here, just to be safe, it can not hurt, right? greg k-h _______________________________________________ devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://driverdev.linuxdriverproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
