On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 05:46:59PM -0700, Sherry Yang wrote: > Binder driver allocates buffer meta data in a region that is mapped > in user space. These meta data contain pointers in the kernel. > > This patch allocates buffer meta data on the kernel heap that is > not mapped in user space, and uses a pointer to refer to the data mapped. > > Also move alloc->buffers initialization from mmap to init since it's > now used even when mmap failed or was not called. > > Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang <sherryy@xxxxxxxxxxx> > --- The difference between v2 and v3 is that we've shifted some initialization around to fix the crashing bug that kbuild found. You should not that difference here under the --- cut off. > drivers/android/binder_alloc.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++------------- > drivers/android/binder_alloc.h | 2 +- > drivers/android/binder_alloc_selftest.c | 11 ++- > 3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) But really we still need to have some answers or discussion about the questions that Greg and I raised. Greg asked if the other Android devs had Acked this. Please ping Arve to Ack this. I was curious about the security impact or why we were writing this patch 3/6. It seems we are fixing an information disclosure bug. Or is it something worse than that? Or have I misunderstood entirely. We probably original put the buffers in userspace for accounting reasons so we could kill programs that used too much RAM. This patch doesn't create a problem with that hopefully? We're just moving the metadata to kernel space? regards, dan carpenter _______________________________________________ devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://driverdev.linuxdriverproject.org/mailman/listinfo/driverdev-devel