Re: [RFC v1 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

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On 04/15/2016 06:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
+void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	unsigned long addr = memory_rand_start;
+	unsigned long padding, rand, mem_tb;
+	struct rnd_state rnd_st;
+	unsigned long remain_padding = memory_rand_end - memory_rand_start;
+
+	if (!kaslr_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	/* Take the additional space when Xen is not active. */
+	if (!xen_domain())
+		page_offset_base -= __XEN_SPACE;

This should be !xen_pv_domain(). Xen HVM guests are no different from bare metal as far as address ranges are concerned. (Technically it's probably !xen_pv_domain() && !xen_pvh_domain() but we can ignore PVH for now since it is being replaced by an HVM-type guest)

Having said that, I am not sure I understand why page_offset_base is shifted. I thought 0xffff800000000000 - 0xffff87ffffffffff is not supposed to be used by anyone, whether we are running under a hypervisor or not.

-boris


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