Hi, Sorry for the delayed response, EINBOXOVERFLOW. On 2023-07-26 16:02:26 -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote: > Andres Freund <andres@xxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > > > Hi, > > > > On 2023-06-30 15:10:03 +0000, Matteo Rizzo wrote: > >> Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, > >> or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring > >> instances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls to > >> io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM unless the calling process has > >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM > >> regardless of privilege. > > > > Hm, is there a chance that instead of requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN, a certain group > > could be required (similar to hugetlb_shm_group)? Requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN > > could have the unintended consequence of io_uring requiring tasks being run > > with more privileges than needed... Or some other more granular way of > > granting the right to use io_uring? > > That's fine with me, so long as there is still an option to completely > disable io_uring. Makes sense. > > ISTM that it'd be nice if e.g. a systemd service specification could allow > > some services to use io_uring, without allowing it for everyone, or requiring > > to run services effectively as root. > > Do you have a proposal for how that would work? I think group based permissions would allow for it, even if perhaps not in the most beautiful manner. Systemd can configure additional groups for a service with SupplementaryGroups, so adding a "io_uring" group or such should work. Greetings, Andres Freund
