Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring instances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM unless the calling process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM regardless of privilege. Signed-off-by: Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@xxxxxxx> --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++ io_uring/io_uring.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index 3800fab1619b..ee65f7aeb0cf 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -450,6 +450,25 @@ this allows system administrators to override the ``IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT`` ``prctl`` and avoid logs being flooded. +io_uring_disabled +================= + +Prevents all processes from creating new io_uring instances. Enabling this +shrinks the kernel's attack surface. + += ================================================================== +0 All processes can create io_uring instances as normal. This is the + default setting. +1 io_uring creation is disabled for unprivileged processes. + io_uring_setup fails with -EPERM unless the calling process is + privileged (CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Existing io_uring instances can + still be used. +2 io_uring creation is disabled for all processes. io_uring_setup + always fails with -EPERM. Existing io_uring instances can still be + used. += ================================================================== + + kexec_load_disabled =================== diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c index e8096d502a7c..5410f5576980 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c @@ -152,6 +152,22 @@ static void __io_submit_flush_completions(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); struct kmem_cache *req_cachep; +static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static struct ctl_table kernel_io_uring_disabled_table[] = { + { + .procname = "io_uring_disabled", + .data = &sysctl_io_uring_disabled, + .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_io_uring_disabled), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO, + }, + {}, +}; +#endif + struct sock *io_uring_get_socket(struct file *file) { #if defined(CONFIG_UNIX) @@ -4015,9 +4031,19 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params) return io_uring_create(entries, &p, params); } +static inline bool io_uring_allowed(void) +{ + int disabled = READ_ONCE(sysctl_io_uring_disabled); + + return disabled == 0 || (disabled == 1 && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)); +} + SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries, struct io_uring_params __user *, params) { + if (!io_uring_allowed()) + return -EPERM; + return io_uring_setup(entries, params); } @@ -4592,6 +4618,11 @@ static int __init io_uring_init(void) req_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(io_kiocb, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL + register_sysctl_init("kernel", kernel_io_uring_disabled_table); +#endif + return 0; }; __initcall(io_uring_init); -- 2.41.0.255.g8b1d071c50-goog