On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 10:35 AM, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 02/27, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 9:11 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> > On 02/24, Will Drewry wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
>>> >> {
>>> >> struct seccomp_filter *f;
>>> >> - u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>>> >> static const struct bpf_load_fn fns = {
>>> >> bpf_load,
>>> >> sizeof(struct seccomp_data),
>>> >> };
>>> >> + u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
>>> >> const void *sc_ptr = (const void *)(uintptr_t)syscall;
>>> >>
>>> >> + /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
>>> >> + if (unlikely(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
>>> >> + ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>>> >
>>> > Is "seccomp.filter == NULL" really possible?
>>>
>>> It should not be, but I'm much more comfortable with this failing
>>> closed. I think it's important to be as defensive as possible with
>>> this code given its intended use.
>>
>> Can't resists... Sorry, I know I am troll but personally I think
>> in this case the most defensive code is BUG_ON(->filter == NULL)
>> or at least WARN_ON().
>
> Linus will probably object because he objected (correctly) to a very
> similar problem in my old vsyscall emulation series. A userspace
> security feature shouldn't have a failure mode in which it confuses
> the kernel and results in an oops, unless the situation is really
> unrecoverable. So WARN_ON plus do_exit would be okay but BUG_ON would
> not.
Yeah, actually, add WARN_ON would be preferred here because it should
be an impossible situation. It should still fail closed, though:
/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
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