On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 9:11 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 02/24, Will Drewry wrote:
>>
>> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
>> {
>> struct seccomp_filter *f;
>> - u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>> static const struct bpf_load_fn fns = {
>> bpf_load,
>> sizeof(struct seccomp_data),
>> };
>> + u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
>> const void *sc_ptr = (const void *)(uintptr_t)syscall;
>>
>> + /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
>> + if (unlikely(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
>> + ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>
> Is "seccomp.filter == NULL" really possible?
It should not be, but I'm much more comfortable with this failing
closed. I think it's important to be as defensive as possible with
this code given its intended use.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
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