On Tue, Mar 4, 2025 at 9:47 AM Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Mar 3, 2025, at 3:40 PM, Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 12:52 PM Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>> On Feb 28, 2025, at 9:14 AM, Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>> On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 9:09 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>>> On Thu, 2025-02-27 at 17:22 -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> I'd still also like to see some discussion about moving towards the > >>>>> addition of keyrings oriented towards usage instead of limiting > >>>>> ourselves to keyrings that are oriented on the source of the keys. > >>>>> Perhaps I'm missing some important detail which makes this > >>>>> impractical, but it seems like an obvious improvement to me and would > >>>>> go a long way towards solving some of the problems that we typically > >>>>> see with kernel keys. > >> > >> The intent is not to limit ourselves to the source of the key. The main > >> point of Clavis is to allow the end-user to determine what kernel keys > >> they want to trust and for what purpose, irrespective of the originating > >> source (.builtin_trusted, .secondary, .machine, or .platform). If we could > >> go back in time, individual keyrings could be created that are oriented > >> toward usage. The idea for introducing Clavis is to bridge what we > >> have today with kernel keys and allow them to be usage based. > > > > While it is unlikely that the current well known keyrings could be > > removed, I see no reason why new usage oriented keyrings could not be > > introduced. We've seen far more significant shifts in the kernel over > > the years. > > Could you further clarify how a usage oriented keyring would work? For > example, if a kernel module keyring was added, how would the end-user > add keys to it while maintaining a root of trust? Consider it an exercise left to the reader :) I imagine there are different ways one could do that, either using traditional user/group/capability permissions and/or LSM permissions, it would depend on the environment and the security goals of the overall system. -- paul-moore.com
