> On Mar 3, 2025, at 3:40 PM, Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 12:52 PM Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Feb 28, 2025, at 9:14 AM, Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 9:09 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On Thu, 2025-02-27 at 17:22 -0500, Paul Moore wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I'd still also like to see some discussion about moving towards the >>>>> addition of keyrings oriented towards usage instead of limiting >>>>> ourselves to keyrings that are oriented on the source of the keys. >>>>> Perhaps I'm missing some important detail which makes this >>>>> impractical, but it seems like an obvious improvement to me and would >>>>> go a long way towards solving some of the problems that we typically >>>>> see with kernel keys. >> >> The intent is not to limit ourselves to the source of the key. The main >> point of Clavis is to allow the end-user to determine what kernel keys >> they want to trust and for what purpose, irrespective of the originating >> source (.builtin_trusted, .secondary, .machine, or .platform). If we could >> go back in time, individual keyrings could be created that are oriented >> toward usage. The idea for introducing Clavis is to bridge what we >> have today with kernel keys and allow them to be usage based. > > While it is unlikely that the current well known keyrings could be > removed, I see no reason why new usage oriented keyrings could not be > introduced. We've seen far more significant shifts in the kernel over > the years. Could you further clarify how a usage oriented keyring would work? For example, if a kernel module keyring was added, how would the end-user add keys to it while maintaining a root of trust?
