On Sat, 2 Nov 2024 at 11:38, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Sat Nov 2, 2024 at 11:02 AM EET, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > Same for the ioctl() [as well as the read-write sysfs node]: looking > > at the code (patch 19/20) it doesn't seem like user space needs to be > > able to modify this at all, at least not for the patch set as > > presented. So for now, can we just stick with making the sysfs node > > read-only? > > Short answer: I have no idea. I would not mind that but neither > the commit message for TPM give a clue on this. Actually, I *do > not care* if it is RO and RW but I'm neither good at guessing > random shit. > You were cc'ed on the rest of the series, no? Shall we clarify this first, before proposing patches that introduce new ioctls() and kernel command line parameters to a security sensitive subsystem? My reading of 19/20 is that the secure launch module sets the default locality, and given that it can be built as a module, setting the default locality needs to be exported to modules (but as I indicated, this should probably be in a TPM internal module namespace) If setting the default locality from user space is a requirement down the road, we can discuss it then. For now, let's not go off into the weeds and derail this series even more.
