On Tue, 21 May 2024 16:49:52 -0500
Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 08:49:59AM +0800, Binbin Wu wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 5/17/2024 1:23 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 10:29 AM Binbin Wu
> > > <binbin.wu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On 5/1/2024 4:51 PM, Michael Roth wrote:
> > > > > SEV-SNP VMs can ask the hypervisor to change the page state
> > > > > in the RMP table to be private or shared using the Page State
> > > > > Change MSR protocol as defined in the GHCB specification.
> > > > >
> > > > > When using gmem, private/shared memory is allocated through
> > > > > separate pools, and KVM relies on userspace issuing a
> > > > > KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES KVM ioctl to tell the KVM MMU
> > > > > whether or not a particular GFN should be backed by private
> > > > > memory or not.
> > > > >
> > > > > Forward these page state change requests to userspace so that
> > > > > it can issue the expected KVM ioctls. The KVM MMU will handle
> > > > > updating the RMP entries when it is ready to map a private
> > > > > page into a guest.
> > > > >
> > > > > Use the existing KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall format to
> > > > > deliver these requests to userspace via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL.
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
> > > > > Co-developed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 6 ++++
> > > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 48
> > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 54
> > > > > insertions(+)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> > > > > b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h index
> > > > > 1006bfffe07a..6d68db812de1 100644 ---
> > > > > a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h +++
> > > > > b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h @@ -101,11 +101,17 @@
> > > > > enum psc_op { /* GHCBData[11:0] */
> > > > > \ GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ)
> > > > >
> > > > > +#define GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_TO_GFN(msr) (((msr) &
> > > > > GENMASK_ULL(51, 12)) >> 12) +#define
> > > > > GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_TO_OP(msr) (((msr) & GENMASK_ULL(55, 52)) >>
> > > > > 52) + #define GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP 0x015
> > > > > #define GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val) \
> > > > > /* GHCBData[63:32] */ \
> > > > > (((u64)(val) & GENMASK_ULL(63, 32)) >> 32)
> > > > >
> > > > > +/* Set highest bit as a generic error response */
> > > > > +#define GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_ERROR (BIT_ULL(63) |
> > > > > GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP) +
> > > > > /* GHCB Hypervisor Feature Request/Response */
> > > > > #define GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_REQ 0x080
> > > > > #define GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP 0x081
> > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> > > > > index e1ac5af4cb74..720775c9d0b8 100644
> > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> > > > > @@ -3461,6 +3461,48 @@ static void set_ghcb_msr(struct
> > > > > vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value) svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = value;
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > +static int snp_complete_psc_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> > > > > +
> > > > > + if (vcpu->run->hypercall.ret)
> > > > Do we have definition of ret? I didn't find clear documentation
> > > > about it. According to the code, 0 means succssful. Is there
> > > > any other error codes need to or can be interpreted?
> > > They are defined in include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
> > >
> > > #define KVM_ENOSYS 1000
> > > #define KVM_EFAULT EFAULT /* 14 */
> > > #define KVM_EINVAL EINVAL /* 22 */
> > > #define KVM_E2BIG E2BIG /* 7 */
> > > #define KVM_EPERM EPERM /* 1*/
> > > #define KVM_EOPNOTSUPP 95
> > >
> > > Linux however does not expect the hypercall to fail for
> > > SEV/SEV-ES; and it will terminate the guest if the PSC operation
> > > fails for SEV-SNP. So it's best for userspace if the hypercall
> > > always succeeds. :)
> > Thanks for the info.
> >
> > For TDX, it wants to restrict the size of memory range for
> > conversion in one hypercall to avoid a too long latency.
> > Previously, in TDX QEMU patchset v5, the limitation is in userspace
> > and if the size is too big, the status_code will set to
> > TDG_VP_VMCALL_RETRY and the failed GPA for guest to retry is
> > updated.
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240229063726.610065-51-xiaoyao.li@xxxxxxxxx/
> >
> > When TDX converts TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA to KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE, do you
> > think which is more reasonable to set the restriction? In KVM (TDX
> > specific code) or userspace?
> > If userspace is preferred, then the interface needs to be extended
> > to support it.
>
> With SNP we might get a batch of requests in a single GHCB request,
> and potentially each of those requests need to get set out to
> userspace as a single KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE. The subsequent patch here
> handles that in a loop by issuing a new KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE via the
> completion handler. So we also sort of need to split large requests
> into multiple userspace requests in some cases.
>
> It seems like TDX should be able to do something similar by limiting
> the size of each KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE to TDX_MAP_GPA_MAX_LEN, and then
> returning TDG_VP_VMCALL_RETRY to guest if the original size was
> greater than TDX_MAP_GPA_MAX_LEN. But at that point you're
> effectively done with the entire request and can return to guest, so
> it actually seems a little more straightforward than the SNP case
> above. E.g. TDX has a 1:1 mapping between TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA and
> KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE events. (And even similar names :))
>
> So doesn't seem like there's a good reason to expose any of these
> throttling details to userspace, in which case existing
> KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE interface seems like it should be sufficient.
>
Is there any rough data about the latency of private-shared and
shared-private page conversion?
Thanks,
Zhi.
> -Mike
>
> >
> >
> > >
> > > > For TDX, it may also want to use KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall
> > > > to userspace via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL.
> > > Yes, definitely.
> > >
> > > Paolo
> > >
> >
>
