On Wed, Aug 31, 2022 at 9:56 AM Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 11:48:23AM +0100, Ignat Korchagin wrote: > > > > I vaguely remember some initial research in quantum-resistant > > signatures, which used HMAC for "signing" thus don't have any public > > keys. But it is way beyond my expertise to comment on the practicality > > and availability of such schemes. > > We could always add this again should an algorithm requiring > it be introduced. > > > I'm more concerned here about a buggy "third-party" RSA driver, which > > may not implement the callback and which gets prioritised by the > > framework, thus giving the ability to trigger a NULL-ptr dereference > > from userspace via keyctl(2). I think the Crypto API framework should > > be a bit more robust to handle such a case, but I also understand that > > there are a lot of "if"s in this scenario and we can say it is up to > > crypto driver not to be buggy. Therefore, consider my opinion as not > > strong and I can post a v2, which does not provide a default stub for > > set_pub_key, if you prefer. > > If you're concerned with buggy algorithms/drivers, we should > ensure that the self-tests catch this. So it does currently, because I caught it via testmgr. Will send a v2 without a default set_pub_key.
