On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 11:48:23AM +0100, Ignat Korchagin wrote: > > I vaguely remember some initial research in quantum-resistant > signatures, which used HMAC for "signing" thus don't have any public > keys. But it is way beyond my expertise to comment on the practicality > and availability of such schemes. We could always add this again should an algorithm requiring it be introduced. > I'm more concerned here about a buggy "third-party" RSA driver, which > may not implement the callback and which gets prioritised by the > framework, thus giving the ability to trigger a NULL-ptr dereference > from userspace via keyctl(2). I think the Crypto API framework should > be a bit more robust to handle such a case, but I also understand that > there are a lot of "if"s in this scenario and we can say it is up to > crypto driver not to be buggy. Therefore, consider my opinion as not > strong and I can post a v2, which does not provide a default stub for > set_pub_key, if you prefer. If you're concerned with buggy algorithms/drivers, we should ensure that the self-tests catch this. Cheers, -- Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
