On Sat 2022-05-14 13:23:07, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > The RNG incorporates RDRAND into its state at boot and every time it > reseeds, so there's no reason for callers to use it directly. The > hashing that the RNG does on it is preferable to using the bytes raw. > > The only current use case of it is vsprintf's siphash key for pointer > hashing, which uses it to initialize the pointer secret earlier than > usual if RDRAND is available. In order to replace this narrow use case, > just expose whether RDRAND is available. With that taken care of, there > are no users of get_random_bytes_arch() left, so the function can be > removed. > > Later if trust_cpu gets turned on by default (as most distros are > doing), this one use of rng_has_arch_random() can probably go away as > well. > > Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@xxxxxxxx> > Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> Looks good to me. Thanks for the clean up. Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@xxxxxxxx> # for vsprintf.c Best Regards, Petr
