On Mon, Jan 27, 2020 at 05:08:21PM +0200, Gilad Ben-Yossef wrote: > Deal gracefully with the event of being handed a scatterlist > which is shorter than expected. > > This mitigates a crash in some cases due to > attempt to map empty (but not NULL) scatterlists with none > zero lengths. > > Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> It's definitely wrong use of the crypto API to pass a scatterlist that's too short. Note that this is *not* what the test code is doing. So I don't think you should be hacking around it here. It is possible the bug is actually in cc_aead_chain_data()? It looks like it's adding the authentication tag size to the source data size for encryption, which is not correct. The authentication tag is part of the destination only. size_for_map += (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ? authsize : 0; src_mapped_nents = cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->src, size_for_map, &src_last_bytes); - Eric
