On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 2:32 AM Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Some changes to the TCP fastopen code to make it more robust > against future changes in the choice of key/cookie size, etc. > > - Instead of keeping the SipHash key in an untyped u8[] buffer > and casting it to the right type upon use, use the correct > siphash_key_t type directly. This ensures that the key will > appear at the correct alignment if we ever change the way > these data structures are allocated. (Currently, they are > only allocated via kmalloc so they always appear at the > correct alignment) > > - Use DIV_ROUND_UP when sizing the u64[] array to hold the > cookie, so it is always of sufficient size, even when > TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX is no longer a multiple of 8. > > - Add a key length check to tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(). No > callers exist currently that fail this check (they all pass > compile constant values that equal TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH), > but future changes might create problems, e.g., by leaving part > of the key uninitialized, or overflowing the key buffers. > > Note that none of these are functional changes wrt the current > state of the code. > ... > - memcpy(ctx->key[0], primary_key, len); > + if (unlikely(len != TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH)) { > + pr_err("TCP: TFO key length %u invalid\n", len); > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } Why a pr_err() is there ? Can unpriv users flood the syslog ?