Some changes to the TCP fastopen code to make it more robust
against future changes in the choice of key/cookie size, etc.
- Instead of keeping the SipHash key in an untyped u8[] buffer
and casting it to the right type upon use, use the correct
siphash_key_t type directly. This ensures that the key will
appear at the correct alignment if we ever change the way
these data structures are allocated. (Currently, they are
only allocated via kmalloc so they always appear at the
correct alignment)
- Use DIV_ROUND_UP when sizing the u64[] array to hold the
cookie, so it is always of sufficient size, even when
TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX is no longer a multiple of 8.
- Add a key length check to tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(). No
callers exist currently that fail this check (they all pass
compile constant values that equal TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH),
but future changes might create problems, e.g., by leaving part
of the key uninitialized, or overflowing the key buffers.
Note that none of these are functional changes wrt the current
state of the code.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/tcp.h | 2 +-
include/net/tcp.h | 5 +++--
net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 22 ++++++++++++--------
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h
index 2689b0b0b68a..3d3659c638a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static inline unsigned int tcp_optlen(const struct sk_buff *skb)
/* TCP Fast Open Cookie as stored in memory */
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie {
- u64 val[TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX / sizeof(u64)];
+ u64 val[DIV_ROUND_UP(TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX, sizeof(u64))];
s8 len;
bool exp; /* In RFC6994 experimental option format */
};
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 573c9e9b0d72..9456b0834e21 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/memcontrol.h>
#include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
extern struct inet_hashinfo tcp_hashinfo;
@@ -1623,14 +1624,14 @@ void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(struct net *net);
bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_check(struct sock *sk, u16 *mss,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *cookie);
bool tcp_fastopen_defer_connect(struct sock *sk, int *err);
-#define TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH 16
+#define TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH sizeof(siphash_key_t)
#define TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX 2
#define TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_BUF_LENGTH \
(TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH * TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX)
/* Fastopen key context */
struct tcp_fastopen_context {
- __u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX][TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
+ siphash_key_t key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX];
int num;
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
index 46b67128e1ca..61c15c3d3584 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
-#include <linux/siphash.h>
#include <net/inetpeer.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
@@ -81,9 +80,15 @@ int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
goto out;
}
- memcpy(ctx->key[0], primary_key, len);
+ if (unlikely(len != TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH)) {
+ pr_err("TCP: TFO key length %u invalid\n", len);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&ctx->key[0], primary_key, len);
if (backup_key) {
- memcpy(ctx->key[1], backup_key, len);
+ memcpy(&ctx->key[1], backup_key, len);
ctx->num = 2;
} else {
ctx->num = 1;
@@ -110,10 +115,9 @@ int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(struct request_sock *req,
struct sk_buff *syn,
- const u8 *key,
+ const siphash_key_t *key,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc)
{
- BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH != sizeof(siphash_key_t));
BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE != sizeof(u64));
if (req->rsk_ops->family == AF_INET) {
@@ -122,7 +126,7 @@ static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(struct request_sock *req,
foc->val[0] = siphash(&iph->saddr,
sizeof(iph->saddr) +
sizeof(iph->daddr),
- (const siphash_key_t *)key);
+ key);
foc->len = TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE;
return true;
}
@@ -133,7 +137,7 @@ static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(struct request_sock *req,
foc->val[0] = siphash(&ip6h->saddr,
sizeof(ip6h->saddr) +
sizeof(ip6h->daddr),
- (const siphash_key_t *)key);
+ key);
foc->len = TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE;
return true;
}
@@ -154,7 +158,7 @@ static void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct sock *sk,
rcu_read_lock();
ctx = tcp_fastopen_get_ctx(sk);
if (ctx)
- __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(req, syn, ctx->key[0], foc);
+ __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(req, syn, &ctx->key[0], foc);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -218,7 +222,7 @@ static int tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_check(struct sock *sk,
if (!ctx)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < tcp_fastopen_context_len(ctx); i++) {
- __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(req, syn, ctx->key[i], foc);
+ __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(req, syn, &ctx->key[i], foc);
if (tcp_fastopen_cookie_match(foc, orig)) {
ret = i + 1;
goto out;
--
2.17.1
