On Di, 2018-07-24 at 15:03 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > On Tue 2018-07-24 14:47:54, Oliver Neukum wrote: > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 14:01 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: Hi, > > > Safe against what kind of attack? Please describe what kind of > > > security you are trying to provide. > > > > Unsigned code must not take over the priviledge level of signed code. > > Hence: > > > > 1. Unsigned code must not allowed to read sensitive parts of signed > > code's memory space > > > > 2. Unsigned code must not be able to alter the memory space of > > signed code -> snapshots that are changed must not be able to be > > resumed > > Ok. > > > > I don't think generating key in userspace is good enough for providing > > > guarantees for secure-boot. > > > > Why? > > Because then, userpace has both key (now) and encrypted image (after > reboot), so it can decrypt, modify, re-encrypt...? Right. I was dense. But if the key is generated in kernel space, the method works, doesn't it? Regards Oliver
