On Di, 2018-07-24 at 14:01 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > Hi! > > > > > > "There have some functions be locked-down because > > > > > there have no appropriate mechanisms to check the > > > > > integrity of writing data." > > > > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10476751/ > > > > > > > > So your goal is to make hibernation compatible with kernel > > > > lockdown? Do your patches provide sufficient security that hibernation > > > > can be enabled with kernel lockdown? > > > > > > OK, maybe I am dense, but if the key comes from user space, will that > > > be enough? > > > > > > > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people > > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the > > kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this > > should also be safe for encryption in kernel. > > Safe against what kind of attack? Please describe what kind of > security you are trying to provide. Unsigned code must not take over the priviledge level of signed code. Hence: 1. Unsigned code must not allowed to read sensitive parts of signed code's memory space 2. Unsigned code must not be able to alter the memory space of signed code -> snapshots that are changed must not be able to be resumed > I don't think generating key in userspace is good enough for providing > guarantees for secure-boot. Why? Regards Oliver
