Hi! > > > Yes. But you are objecting to encryption in kernel space at all, > > > aren't you? > > > > I don't particulary love the idea of doing hibernation encryption in > > the kernel, correct. > > > > But we have this weird thing called secure boot, some people seem to > > want. So we may need some crypto in the kernel -- but I'd like > > something that works with uswsusp, too. Plus, it is mandatory that > > patch explains what security guarantees they want to provide against > > what kinds of attacks... > > > > Lee, Chun-Yi's patch seemed more promising. Pavel > > > The only difference between Chun-Yi's hibernation encrytion solution > and our solution is that his strategy encrypts the snapshot from sratch, > and ours encryts each page before them going to block device. The benefit > of his solution is that the snapshot can be encrypt in kernel first > thus the uswsusp is allowed to read it to user space even kernel > is lock down. And I had a discussion with Chun-Yi that we can use > his snapshot solution to make uswsusp happy, and we share the crypto > help code and he can also use our user provided key for his signature. > >From this point of view, our code are actually the same, except that > we can help clean up the code and also enhance some encrytion process > for his solution. I don't know why you don't like encryption in kernel, > because from my point of view, without encryption hibernation in kernel, > uswsusp could not be enabled if kernel is lock down : -) Or do I miss something? We can do encryption in kernel if really needed, but I don't have to like it, do I? :-). I understand what Chun-Yi's code is trying to do. I can't say the same about yours. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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