Re: [RFC PATCH] crypto: chacha20 - add implementation using 96-bit nonce

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On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 10:54:24PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> Note that there are two conflicting conventions for what inputs ChaCha takes.
> >> The original paper by Daniel Bernstein
> >> (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) says that the block counter is
> >> 64-bit and the nonce is 64-bit, thereby expanding the key into 2^64 randomly
> >> accessible streams, each containing 2^64 randomly accessible 64-byte blocks.
> >>
> >> The RFC 7539 convention is equivalent to seeking to a large offset (determined
> >> by the first 32 bits of the 96-bit nonce) in the keystream defined by the djb
> >> convention, but only if the 32-bit portion of the block counter never overflows.
> >>
> >> Maybe it is only RFC 7539 that matters because that is what is being
> >> standardized by the IETF; I don't know.  But it confused me.
> >>
> >
> > The distinction only matters if you start the counter at zero (or
> > one), because you 'lose' 32 bits of IV that will never be != 0 in
> > practice if you use a 64-bit counter.
> >
> > So that argues for not exposing the block counter as part of the API,
> > given that it should start at zero anyway, and that you should take
> > care not to put colliding values in it.
> >
> >> Anyway, I actually thought it was intentional that the ChaCha implementations in
> >> the Linux kernel allowed specifying the block counter, and therefore allowed
> >> seeking to any point in the keystream, exposing the full functionality of the
> >> cipher.  It's true that it's easily misused though, so there may nevertheless be
> >> value in providing a nonce-only variant.
> >>
> >
> > Currently, the skcipher API does not allow such random access, so
> > while I can see how that could be a useful feature, we can't really
> > make use of it today. But more importantly, it still does not mean the
> > block counter should be exposed to the /users/ of the skcipher API
> > which typically encrypt/decrypt blocks that are much larger than 64
> > bytes.
> 
> ... but now that I think of it, how is this any different from, say,
> AES in CTR mode? The counter is big endian, but apart from that, using
> IVs derived from a counter will result in the exact same issue, only
> with a shift of 16 bytes.
> 
> That means using file block numbers as IV is simply inappropriate, and
> you should encrypt them first like is done for AES-CBC

The problem with using a stream cipher --- whether that is ChaCha20, AES-CTR, or
something else --- for disk/file encryption is that by necessity of file/disk
encryption, each time the "same" block is written to, the IV is the same, which
is really bad for stream ciphers (but not as bad for AES-XTS, AES-CBC, etc.).
It's irrelevant whether you do ESSIV or otherwise encrypt the IVs.  ESSIV does
make the IV for each offset unpredictable by an attacker, which is desirable for
AES-CBC, but it doesn't stop the IV from being repeated for each overwrite.

And just to clarify, you definitely *can* seek to any position in the ChaCha20
stream using the existing ChaCha20 implementations and the existing skcipher
API, simply by providing the appropriate IV.  Maybe it was unintentional, but it
does work.  chacha20poly1305.c even uses it to start at block 1 instead of block
0.  I don't know whether there are other users, though.

Eric



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