On 8 December 2017 at 22:17, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 11:55:02AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating >> our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk of IV reuse when using a >> little endian counter as the IV generator. The reason is that the low end >> bits of the counter get mapped onto the ChaCha20 block counter, which >> advances every 64 bytes. This means that the counter value that gets >> selected as IV for the next input block will collide with the ChaCha20 >> block counter of the previous block, basically recreating the same >> keystream but shifted by 64 bytes. >> >> RFC7539 describes the inputs of the algorithm as follows: >> >> The inputs to ChaCha20 are: >> >> o A 256-bit key >> >> o A 32-bit initial counter. This can be set to any number, but will >> usually be zero or one. It makes sense to use one if we use the >> zero block for something else, such as generating a one-time >> authenticator key as part of an AEAD algorithm. >> >> o A 96-bit nonce. In some protocols, this is known as the >> Initialization Vector. >> >> o An arbitrary-length plaintext >> >> The solution is to use a fixed value of 0 for the initial counter, and >> only expose a 96-bit IV to the upper layers of the crypto API. >> >> So introduce a new ChaCha20 flavor called chacha20-iv96, which takes the >> above into account, and should become the preferred ChaCha20 >> implementation going forward for general use. > > Note that there are two conflicting conventions for what inputs ChaCha takes. > The original paper by Daniel Bernstein > (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) says that the block counter is > 64-bit and the nonce is 64-bit, thereby expanding the key into 2^64 randomly > accessible streams, each containing 2^64 randomly accessible 64-byte blocks. > > The RFC 7539 convention is equivalent to seeking to a large offset (determined > by the first 32 bits of the 96-bit nonce) in the keystream defined by the djb > convention, but only if the 32-bit portion of the block counter never overflows. > > Maybe it is only RFC 7539 that matters because that is what is being > standardized by the IETF; I don't know. But it confused me. > The distinction only matters if you start the counter at zero (or one), because you 'lose' 32 bits of IV that will never be != 0 in practice if you use a 64-bit counter. So that argues for not exposing the block counter as part of the API, given that it should start at zero anyway, and that you should take care not to put colliding values in it. > Anyway, I actually thought it was intentional that the ChaCha implementations in > the Linux kernel allowed specifying the block counter, and therefore allowed > seeking to any point in the keystream, exposing the full functionality of the > cipher. It's true that it's easily misused though, so there may nevertheless be > value in providing a nonce-only variant. > Currently, the skcipher API does not allow such random access, so while I can see how that could be a useful feature, we can't really make use of it today. But more importantly, it still does not mean the block counter should be exposed to the /users/ of the skcipher API which typically encrypt/decrypt blocks that are much larger than 64 bytes.
