Am Dienstag, 17. Januar 2017, 23:12:50 CET schrieb Theodore Ts'o: Hi Theodore, > On Tue, Dec 27, 2016 at 11:39:57PM +0100, Stephan Müller wrote: > > The random_ready callback mechanism is intended to replicate the > > getrandom system call behavior to in-kernel users. As the getrandom > > system call unblocks with crng_init == 1, trigger the random_ready > > wakeup call at the same time. > > It was deliberate that random_ready would only get triggered with > crng_init==2. > > In general I'm assuming kernel callers really want real randomness (as > opposed to using prandom), where as there's a lot of b.s. userspace > users of kernel randomness (for things that really don't require > cryptographic randomness, e.g., for salting Python dictionaries, > systemd/udev using /dev/urandom for non-cryptographic, non-security > applications etc.) Users of getrandom want to ensure that they get random data from a DRNG that is seeded, just like in-kernel users may want if they choose the callback- approach. I do not understand why there should be different treatment of in-kernel vs user space callers in that respect. (And yes, I do not want to open a discussion whether crng_init==1 can considered as a sufficiently seeded DRNG as such discussion will lead nowhere.) Ciao Stephan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
